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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., author of The Common Law, was speak-
ing as Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court when in 1910
he wrote, "I know of no authority in this court to say that in general state
decisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have had ret-
rospective operation for near a thousand years."' There is a certain grandeur
in the sweep of Holmes' phrasing, but the statement remains a fair description
of one of the central principles in our received learning on the common law.
T aE RoOTS OF RETROACTIVITY
However distant may be the origin of the principle that judicial decisions
are of their nature retrospective, 2 its more recent influence must be traced to
Blackstone, whose Commentaries provided the classic formulation and made
clear its intellectual justification.3 Blackstone's argument may be stated sim-
ply. The duty of a court, he said, is not to "pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one." 4 Consequently, in deciding a case, a
judge is bound to find the law as it existed when the controversy arose and
to declare it as being the controlling principle in the case.5
From the declaratory nature of a judicial decision, Blackstone derived the
necessity that the decision have retrospective effect. If the decision interpreted
a law, then it did no more than declare what the law had always been. If
1. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
2. In an important book first published in 1713, ten years before Blackstone was born,
Sir Matthew Hale had written:
The decisions of courts of justice . . . do not make a law properly so called for
that only the king and parliament can do; yet they have a great weight and au-
thority in expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this kingdom is
.... And though such decisions are less than a law, yet they are a greater evi-
dence thereof, than the opinion of any private persons, as mich, whatsoever.
HALE, HISTORY OF THE CommoN LAW 141 (5th ed. 1794). The passage is discussed in
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 218-19 (2d ed. 1921).
3. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 218-24. Cf. Carter Oil Co. v. Weil, 209 Ark.
653, 658-59, 192 S.W.2d 215, 218 (1946).
4. 1 BLACKSTONE, ComMENTARIs 69 (1769).
5. As Gray explained the system:
The Law, indeed, is identical with the rules laid down by the judges, but those
rules are laid down by the judges because they are law, they are not the Law be-
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subsequently it became necessary to overrule this first interpretation, it was
equally clear to Blackstone that the overruling decision also did no more than
declare the law-albeit in a more enlightened manner. In the diction which
Blackstone was fond of using, the first decision had been merely an "evidence"
of the law-and as it subsequently developed, an erroneous evidence.6 Once
it was postulated that courts must limit themselves to finding and declaring
the law, the necessity of retroactive application of overruling decisions easily
followed.7 In a famous passage, Blackstone said:
These judicial decisions are the principal and the most authoritative evi-
dence that can be given of the existence of such a custom as shall form
a part of the common law .... Yet this rule admits of exceptions where
the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason .... But
even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new
law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be
found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is de-
clared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law;
that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as had been
erroneously determined.8
cause they are laid down by the judges; or . .. the judges are the discoverers, not
the creators, of the Law.
GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93.
6. As Dean Shulman expressed it:
The doctrinal reasons are that courts do not "pass" laws, but merely "apply" them
to specific cases; that the overruled decision was a mistake as to the law and con-
sequently never was the law; that the overruling decisions is not a new law but
the application of what is, and therefore had been, the true law.
Shulman, Retroactive Legislation, 13 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 355, 356 (1934).
See, e.g., Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1940) ("Decisions
are mere evidences of the law, not the law itself; and an overruling decision is not a
change of law but a mere correction of an erroneous interpretation." Id. at 764).
The same language has been used in cases involving a change in administrative
regulations issued under a statute. See, e.g., Howard Pore, Inc. v. Nims, 322 Mich. 49,
73, 33 N.W.2d 657, 667 (1948). For a discussion of "retroactive interpretative rules,"
see 1 DAvis, ADInNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.09 (1958).
7. A statement of the "inexorable logic" underlying this theory is given by Professor
Davis:
If an interpretative rule is merely an interpretation of a statute, and if the
meaning of the statute has been there from the time of its original enactment, then
no problem of a retroactive interpretative rule can arise, for either the interpreta-
tive rule expresses the true meaning of the statute or it does not; if it does, then
that is what the statute has always meant and the rule has not changed the law
retroactively; if it does not, then it does not matter whether the rule can be made
retroactive, for the rule is invalid in that it is inconsistent with the statute.
DAvis, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 5.09. See Note, 32 MIcH. L. REv. 1009 (1934). See also
2 WARRN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 748 (rev. ed. 1937) ("How-
ever the Court may interpret the provisions of the Constitution, it is still the Constitution
which is the law and not the decision of the Court.").




If the law had always been what the most recent judicial decision declared
it to be, the possibility existed that a man's actions could be judged by a
standard not yet judicially discovered at the time the actions took place. It
was therefore urged that retroactive application of a judicial decision, when
attempted in the United States, was limited by Article I, section 10 of the
Constitution, which provides that "No State... shall pass any ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." But this view was con-
sistently rejected. The provision, "according to the natural import of its terms,
is a restraint upon legislative power and concerns the making of laws, not
their construction by the courts." So summarized the United States Supreme
Court in Ross v. Oregon,'° rejecting the contention that a state judicial de-
cision which put an unexpected construction on a newly-enacted statute vio-
lated the ex post facto clause. In Frank v. Mangum," the Court rejected the
allied contention that the ex post facto clause is violated by a judicial decision
which overrules or is inconsistent with a prior decision. 12 And the same
rationale was applied to the prohibition against the impairment of contract
obligations: the act of impairment must be a legislative act. Thus, in Tidal
Oil Co. v. Flanagan 13 the Court found no impairment in "the mere fact that
the state court reversed a former decision to the prejudice of one party.' 14
It should not be assumed, however, that retroactive application of a judicial
decision will always be constitutionally permissible. In Brinkerhoif-Faris Trust
& Savings Co. v. Hill 's the taxpayer-company brought suit in a state court
of Missouri to enjoin collection of a state tax on the ground that discrimina-
tory assessment of the tax violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The state courts had repeatedly held, beginning with the Laclede
case,' that under the relevant state statute a suit in equity was the only rem-
edy open to a taxpayer wishing to contest the validity of an assessment; the
possibility of a prior appeal to the State Tax Commission had been termed
"preposterous" and "unthinkable" by the courts.1 7  Consequently, "no one
doubted the authority of the Laclede case until it was expressly overruled in
the case at bar,"' 8 in which the Missouri Supreme Court discovered that the
9. The federal government is prohibited from passing an ex post facto law by Art. I,
§ 9 of the Constitution.
10. 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385 (1798);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810). Cf. Smead, The Rule Against Ret-
roactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936).
11. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
12. Cf. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,
263 U.S. 444, 450 (1924) ; Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29 (1924).
13. 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
14. Id. at 450. See also Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29 (1924).
15. 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
16. Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 295 Mo. 298 (1922).
17. See 281 U.S. at 676.
18. Id. at 677.
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appropriate remedy was in fact an appeal to the State Tax Commission. It
further held that because the period of limitations for appeal to the Commis-
sion had run, and because the company was guilty of laches in not prosecuting
such an appeal, its bill for equitable relief had to be dismissed.
Speaking through Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court held that the ret-
roactive application of the overruling decision, when taken in combination
with the period of limitations, had the effect of denying the company "due
process of law-using that term in its primary sense of an opportunity to be
heard and to defend its substantive right"' 9 to be taxed on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. An appeal to the State Tax Commission before Laclede was re-
versed would have been "entirely futile," the Court said, and an appeal to the
Commission after Laclede was reversed was barred by the period of limita-
tions. Thus, although the state court's decision to give retroactive effect to
the holding in the overruling case-involving no more than "a retroactive
change in the law of remedies" 2 0-was not in itself unconstitutional, it be-
came so when, in combination with the period of limitations, its effect was to
preclude the company from ever being heard on its claim.
Constitutional problems might also be presented, as Mr. Justice Black
pointed out in his opinion in James v. United States,2 1 by retroactive applica-
tion of an overruling decision which reinterprets a criminal statute and, in
effect, announces "the creation of a judicial crime." 22 Application of the over-
ruling decision to acts done during the intervening period might violate the
defendant's right to fair notice and render the statute unconstitutionally vague
during that intervening period.23
But the fact that courts upheld retroactive application of judicial decisions
against attack on constitutional grounds did not end the matter. It only sig-
nalled a shift of the attack to policy grounds. At least three results of the
practice of making judicial decisions retroactive-even if the practice be con-
stitutionally permissible-were said to be deleterious to the creative growth
of an equitable legal system. First, retroactive overruling worked unfair sur-
prise on persons who had justifiably relied upon judicial decisions, thereby
"frustrat[ing] the reasonable expectations of well-intentioned men." Second,
the knowledge that the frustration of such expectations was a necessary con-
sequence of overruling a prior decision served to inhibit the judicial overrul-
ing of precedents which were outworn and outmoded, thereby perpetuating
the life of obsolescent legal rules.2 5 And third, adherence to the rule of retro-
19. Id. at 678.
20. Id. at 681.
21. 366 U.S. 213, 222 (1961).
22. Id. at 224.
23. See note 124 infra.
24. Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR
Ass'N 263, 294 (Jan. 22, 1932).
25. See, e.g., Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950) (and particularly dissent by
Vanderbilt, C.J., id. at 14, 21-28, 76 A.2d at 878, 882-85) ; Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264,
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active overruling obscured in "the murky shadow of Blackstonian jurispru-
dence" the important teachings of the Legal Realists that judges as much as
legislators exercise an "ineluctable lawcreating function," 26 thereby discourag-
ing open and honest analysis of what courts do in fact.2 7
Having stated their objections to the practice of retroactive overruling, the
critics of the Blackstonian view proposed prospective overruling as the rem-
edy.28 Briefly stated, prospective overruling is the judicial technique by which
a court-eager to overrule an outmoded precedent but reluctant to disappoint
the expectations of the parties-applies that precedent in deciding the partic-
ular case before it but simultaneously announces that it shall consider the
precedent as overruled in all future cases.29 Justice Cardozo, the major ad-
vocate of prospective overruling,3 0 gave the following as a "fair paraphrase" 3'
of the doctrine:
266-67 (1925) ; Lombardo v. Adams, 12 Misc. 2d 589, 593-95, 172 N.Y.S.2d 271, 274-76
(Sup. Ct. 1958). Cf. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 402 (1943) ; Bailey v. Richard-
son, 182 F.2d 46, 56-58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
26. Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2,
6 (1960). See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961);
CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
27. See, e.g., FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1930); LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
28. The earliest proposals include Canfield, Speech to South Carolina Bar Association,
REP. S.C. BAR Ass'N 17-19, 20-21 (1917); Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common
Law, 17 COLUm. L. REV. 593, 606 (1917); Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against
the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 CoLum. L. REv. 230, 250-51
(1918) ; WIGMxOR, PROBLEMS OF LAW 79-82 (1920). The first major attack came from
Chief Justice von Moschzisker of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Von Moschzisker,
Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HAtv. L. REv. 409, 426-27 (1924). See also
Note, 47 HAnv. L. REv. 1403, 1412 (1934).
29. See Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal, 17 A.B.
A.J. 180, 182 (1931) ; Kocourek & Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare
Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REv. 971, 995-96 (1935) ; Covington, The American Doctrine of Stare
Decisis, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 190, 203 (1946) ; Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare
Decisis and Law of the Case, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 514 (1943) ; Comment, 25 VA. L. REv. 210
(1938) ; Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1947). Cf. Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Over-
ruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121 (1940).
30. See CAR-ozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-67 (1921) ; Cardozo,
Address Before N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 263, 294-96
(Jan. 22, 1932) ; Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932) (Cardozo,
J.). Cf. LEvY, CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING 109-11 (1938).
It has been suggested that Cardozo's "recurrent interest" in developing methods to
avoid retroactive application of newly-announced rules stemmed from the injustice he felt
when Columbia Law School increased the length of its prescribed course to three years
after he had entered at a time when the required course was only two years. Cardozo did
not finish the three-year course and never received his degree. See Levy, Realist Juris-
prudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 10 n.31 (1960).
31. Cardozo, Address, supra note 30, at 296.
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The rule that we are asked to apply is out of tune with the life about us.
It has been made discordant by the forces that generate a living law. We
apply it to this case because the [judicial] repeal might work hardship to
those who have trusted to its existence. We give notice, however, that
any one trusting to it hereafter will do so at his peril.3 2
Hence, the crucial operative effect of the doctrine is that it allows a court to
have its cake and eat it too-to overrule an outmoded precedent without hav-
ing to disappoint the justified expectations of anyone. 33
NON-BLACKSTONIAN RETROACTIVITY
Although prospective overruling might alleviate certain defects of Black-
stonian retroactivity, it would not provide a complete remedy. For it has long
been held that if there is a change in either the statutory or decisional law
before final judgment is entered, the appellate court must "dispose of [the]
case according to the law as it exists at the time of final judgment, and not
as it existed at the time of the appeal." 34 This rule is usually regarded as be-
ing founded upon the conceptual inability of a court to enforce that which is
no longer the law, even though it may have been the law at the time of trial,
or at the time of the prior appellate proceedings. Thus, treaties, statutes, con-
stitutional amendments, and judicial decisions will often have decisive impli-
cations for events already concluded at the time of their effective date.
The authoritative American statement of the rule was made by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in United States v. Schooner Peggy :3
It is, in the general, true, that the province of an appellate court is
only to inquire whether a judgment, when rendered, was erroneous or
not. But if, subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision of the
appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which
governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. If the law be
constitutional . . . I know of no court which can contest its obligation
.... In such a case, the court must decide according to existing laws,
and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered,
but which cannot be affirmed, but in violation of law, the judgment must
be set aside.3 6
That Schooner Peggy need not have been applied so broadly, however, seems
clear from its facts. The schooner Peggy was a French trading vessel that
32. Ibid.
33. For a statement that prospective overruling "has made great headway, and assumed
substantial importance" in recent decades, see HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 620 (Tent. ed. 1958). For the less
enthusiastic view that prospective overruling has failed "to emerge as a standard appellate
device," see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1960). For a policy argument against prospective overruling, see note 192 infra.
34. Montague v. Maryland, 54 Md. 481, 483 (1880).
35. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 102 (1801).
36. Id. at 108-10.
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had been run ashore and captured by the United States ship Trumbull, acting
under orders of the President to seize any armed French vessel found on the
high seas. An order of condemnation was entered on September 23, 1800. A
week later, while the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the United
States signed a convention with France providing in part that "property cap-
tured, and not yet definitively condemned . . .shall be mutually restored." 37
The Court held that it was bound to follow the treaty and order the judgment
of condemnation set aside, even though it was not erroneous when delivered
by the lower court. It reached this decision by reading "definitively" to mean
"having no further possibility of appeal or judicial review."38
Two considerations, decisive in the literal sense, stand out. First, the treaty
that intervened before final judgment was by its terms framed to be retro-
active and to reach all prior lower court condemnations not yet decided on
appeal. The rule of Schooner Peggy-that a change in governing law before
entry of final judgment must be applied by an appellate court-would seem,
therefore, to be based upon the precise command of retroactive application
made by the treaty that the Court was construing. It would not seem to be
based upon any general principles of jurisprudence applicable whether the
intervening change in law provided for retroactivity or not. Second, Schooner
Peggy, as Chief Justice Marshall carefully pointed out, was not a "mere pri-
vate [case] between individuals"; rather, it involved "great national con-
cerns" and had important foreign policy implications.3 9 To find retroactivity
necessary in such comparatively delicate circumstances might not inevitably
require finding it necessary in circumstances less charged with national and
international significance. These two considerations have not been thought in
subsequent cases to qualify Marshall's broad language, however; as a result,
newly-announced law has been applied retroactively in a variety of circum-
stances quite unlike those present in Schooner Peggy.
Schooner Peggy was concerned with a change made in the positive law by
treaty. But changes in the positive law can also be made by statute. For ex-
ample, in Carpenter v. Wabash Railway Co.,4 0 the plaintiff was denied the
right to intervene in an equity receivership proceeding involving the railroad;
the denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Three weeks after the peti-
tion for certiorari had been filed in the United States Supreme Court, but
before it had been acted upon, Congress amended the relevant statute to au-
thorize intervention by those in petitioner's position. After granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court assumed without deciding "that the determination of the
court below was correct upon the record before it and in the light of the law
as it then stood." But, it added, "it is our duty to consider the amended
37. Id. at 107.
38. Id. at 108.
39. Id. at 110.
40. 309 U.S. 23 (1940).
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statute and to decide the question in harmony with its provisions,"' quoting
Schooner Peggy's language. The judgment denying petitioner the right to in-
tervene was vacated and the district court was directed "to allow petitioner's
claim in accordance with the statutory provision, '42 although the effect of the
decision was admittedly to grant the petitioner a statutory right under a stat-
ute which did not exist at the time he originally asserted it.43
In Vance v. Rankin,44 to cite another example, the plaintiffs succeeded in
obtaining a writ of mandamus to compel town officials to take action made
mandatory by statute. The appellate court affirmed. While the appeal was
pending before the Supreme Court of Illinois, the state legislature amended
the statute to make the action in question discretionary rather than mandatory.
Since there now was no statute in force requiring the town officials to act,
the state supreme court reversed the judgment and dissolved the writ of man-
damus, thus denying the plaintiff a statutory right that existed at the time
he asserted it.
Changes in the positive law before final judgment may also be made by
constitutional amendment. A clear-cut illustration of the effect of such a
change upon pending litigation is provided by United States v. Chamnbers,45
a criminal prosecution 46 under the National Prohibition Act. The two de-
fendants, Chambers and Gibson, were indicted on June 5, 1933. Chambers
pleaded guilty, and judgment was postponed until the December term. On
December 5, 1933, the twenty-first amendment, which repealed the eighteenth
amendment, became effective. The cases of Chambers and Gibson, who had
not yet pleaded, were called on December 6, 1933. The Supreme Court
affirmed dismissal of the indictments on the ground that when "a statute is
repealed or rendered inoperative, no further proceedings can be had to enforce
it in pending prosecutions .... -47 Accordingly, any prosecutions begun before
41. Id. at 26-27.
42. Id. at 30.
43. Contra, Concordia Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 282 U.S. 545 (1931).
44. 194 Ill. 625, 62 N.E. 807 (1902).
45. 291 U.S. 217 (1934).
46. Because this was a criminal prosecution, it builds not only upon the cases which
followed Schooner Peggy but also upon the principle, established at common law, that
repeal of a penal statute prohibits prosecution of acts committed before the repeal if those
acts had not yet been prosecuted to final judgment. The repeal is regarded as an indication
that the state no longer wants such acts punished, regardless of when they took place, and
no longer views them as criminal. Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1514 (1934). The retroactivity which
results from application of this principle may reflect the strict interpretation by which
criminal statutes are traditionally construed. In situations in which the federal "saving"
statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1958), is applicable, however, prosecutions begun before repeal
could be continued. The statute provides that repeal of a federal statute shall not release
prior penalties or liabilities incurred prior to repeal, "unless the repealing act shall so
expressly provide." The Court found the statute inapplicable in Chambers. See 291 U.S.
217, 224 (1934).
47. 291 U.S. at 223.
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repeal may not be continued after repeal, even though the acts listed in the
indictment were criminal when done.48
Changes in the controlling law before final judgment is entered may also
be made by judicial decisions which reverse, qualify, limit, or reinterpret prior
judicial decisions. For example, in Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,4"
plaintiff instituted a diversity action in federal court alleging that she had
contracted silicosis through the negligence of the defendant, her employer.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the law of Ohio,
the governing state, did not permit recovery for such a disease. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. After the trial court had dismissed the complaint, the
Ohio Supreme Court reversed its former decisions and expressly ruled that
silicosis was a compensable illness under Ohio common law. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed; it ruled that the doctrine of
Erie v. Tompkins must be read to incorporate, in effect, the doctrine of
Schooner Peggy. A federal court sitting in a diversity case must therefore
apply the most recent state court decision, even if it came after the operative
events or the entry of judgment by a lower court. "Intervening and conflict-
ing decisions will thus cause the reversal of judgments which were correct
when entered." 0
The Vandenbark Court's commentary upon Schooner Peggy is interesting
because of its awareness of the factual context of the original decision. The
Court noted that Schooner Peggy involved a treaty, not a judicial decision,
and that it involved high national interests, rather than private parties. After
acknowledging the existence of these limiting factors, however, the Court
adopted a broad interpretation, observing quite correctly that "the principle
quoted has found wide acceptance in a variety of situations." 51
48. But cf. Swank v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 204, 78 N.E.2d 535 (1948) (civil) ; Rix v.
Asadoorian, 171 A.2d 925 (N.H. 1961) (civil), holding that an amendment to the state
constitution restricting trial by jury in civil cases to actions involving $500 or more is not
applicable to an action in progress which involved less than $500. The court said:
At the time the defendant requested trial by jury.., the amendment had not taken
effect and the defendant was entitled to trial by jury as it formerly existed ....
171 A.2d at 927.
49. 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
50. Id. at 543. See also Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co., 261 Fed. 878 (2d Cir. 1919),
commented on in CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 158-60 (1921).
51. 311 U.S. 538, 542 (1941). The result in Vandenbark was extended one stage fur-
ther procedurally when the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed on rehearing
a state supreme court decision reversing the state rule which the circuit court had pre-
viously applied to the case. Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
Once a final judgment has been entered, the pressures toward an end to litigation which
are embodied in the principle of res judicata diminish the possibility that a subsequent
change in the law will be applied retroactively. But a party still has available the right to
seek a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, in the federal courts, the right to make a
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from a final judgment. See
7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTiCE ff 60 (2d ed. 1955). For the relevance of an aspect of posture
-failure to appeal-to the availability of habeas corpus, compare Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
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THE RETREAT FRom RETROACTIVITY
The compelling influence of Blackstone upon the early American judiciary
resulted in repeated recitation of the declaratory nature of law. Courts con-
sistently announced that judicial decisions, particularly overruling decisions,
must be retroactive; the requirement of retroactivity was seen as a necessary
consequence of the theory, jealously adhered to, that a court's power was
limited to declaring pre-existent law and did not extend to the making of new
law. But it gradually.became clear that the declaratory theory was too rarefied
to permit just application in many cases. Logomachy, to paraphrase Dean
Shulman, too often triumphed over wisdom and substance.12 It thus became
necessary for courts to develop judicial methods which more closely approached
the achievement of substantial justice by respecting bona fide expectations.
The Legislative Divorce Cases
One example of an area in which nineteenth century courts were moved to
apply their decisions prospectively was that involving direct or collateral at-
tack upon the validity of legislative divorces. Fifty years ago the granting of
divorces by the passage of a special legislative act was still considered appro-
priate in some states; it had enjoyed wide acceptance earlier. 3 If the power
of a legislature to grant divorces was terminated by legislation or a constitu-
tional amendment, all previously-granted legislative divorces were presumably
valid. But when the power was terminated by a judicial decision that the
power had not existed in the legislature ab initio, the validity of existing
legislative divorces was called into uncomfortable question. To make such a
ruling retroactive would be to upset the basis of fundamental social arrange-
ments and to change the status of innocent men, women, and children. Al-
though the cases make for quaint reading today, their importance to the parties
was more than historical.
A typical case was Binghamn v. Miller,54 decided by the Supreme Court of
Ohio in 1848. The plaintiff brought an action in assumpsit. The defendant
introduced evidence that she had been lawfully married and contended, there-
fore, that under the rule disabling married women from entering contracts,
her husband was the only proper defendant. The plaintiff countered by in-
troducing evidence of a legislative divorce granted to her husband. If the
divorce were valid, the wife would be the appropriate defendant. The wife,
174 (1947), with Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). See also Polites v. United
States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960) ; Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371 (1940).
52. See Shulman, Retroactive Legislation, 13 Excyc. Soc. Sci. 356-57 (1934).
53. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206-09 (1888) ; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37,
53 (1857) (citing statistics) ; Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 540 (1831) ; Baldwin, Legislative
Divorces and the Fourteenth Amendment 27 HAv. L. REv. 699 (1914).
54. See 17 Ohio 445 (1848). See, e.g., MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS
256-61 (1931) ; JACOBS & GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 380 (3d ed. 1952). Compare Riche-
son v. Simmons, 47 Mo. 20 (1870), with Winkles v. Powell, 173 Ala. 46, 55 So. 536 (1911).
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therefore, contended that the legislative divorce was void as beyond the power
of the legislature to grant and that in legal contemplation she remained a
married woman. The court refused to charge the jury that the divorce was
invalid, and the defendant assigned the refusal as error. The state supreme
court held that although the legislature had "assumed and exercised this
power [to grant divorces] for a period of more than forty years,"65 it had
done so by encroaching upon a judicial power in violation of the state con-
stitution; the legislature had never had the power to grant divorces.
Strictly, it should follow that the defendant's divorce was invalid, that her
husband was the only appropriate defendant, and that the plaintiff's action
must be dismissed. The court refused to bend to such strictness, however. It
said:
To deny this long exercised power, and declare all the consequences
resulting from it void, is pregnant with fearful consequences. If it affected
only the rights of property, we should not hesitate; but second marriages
have been contracted, and children born, and it would bastardize all of
these, although born under the sanction of apparent wedlock, authorized
by an act of the Legislature before they were born, and in consequence
of which the relation was formed which gave them birth. On account of
these children, and for them only, we hesitate. And in view of this, we
are constrained to content ourselves with simply declaring that the exer-
cise of the power of granting divorces, on the part of the Legislature, is
unwarranted and unconstitutional ....
We trust we have said enough to vindicate the constitution, and feel
confident that no department of State has any disposition to violate it,
and that the evil will cease.5 6
The court therefore affirmed the trial court's refusal to charge that the divorce
was invalid. The effect of the decision was that while no more legislative
divorces could be granted, those already granted would be respected, even
though the legislature had lacked power to grant them. The opinion demon-
strates that the dogmas and shibboleths of necessary retroactivity will not al-
ways be followed when to do so would deny justice without any compensating
gain beyond the preservation of a fiction.
The Municipal Bond Cases
An example of the growth of a similar technique is provided by the series
of municipal bond cases which came before the United States Supreme Court
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The facts in Gelpcke v. Dubu-
que,57 the first and most important of the cases, represent a pattern found in
all the others. The Supreme Court of Iowa repeatedly had held that the legis-
lature had the power to authorize municipalities to issue bonds to aid in the
construction of railroads. After the city of Dubuque had issued bonds under
55. 17 Ohio at 448.
56. Id. at 448-49.
57. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). See Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4
HARv. L. REV. 311 (1891); Read, The Rule in Gelpeke v. Dubuque, 9 Am. L. REv. 381,
397 (1875).
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an authorizing statute, the state supreme court reversed itself and held that
the legislature lacked the power to authorize such bond issues. When the city
refused to make a payment due upon bonds that he held, Gelpcke brought suit
in a federal court in Iowa. It was clear that if he had brought his action in a
state court, Gelpcke would have lost; the state court would have applied the
most recent decision in the area and ruled that because the legislature lacked
the power to authorize bond issues of the type in question, the authorizing
statute had never been the law, and the bonds were therefore never valid
obligations of the city. Indeed, Gelpcke had every reason to expect the same
result in the federal court. For even under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,58
a federal court sitting in a diversity case would usually follow a state court's
interpretation of a state constitutional provision or statute; construction of
such local law was not considered to be a part of that general common law
which a federal court could "make" (or was it "find"?) for itself. 9 Even in
Gelpcke the Supreme Court was "not unmindful of the importance of uniform-
ity in the decisions of this court, and those of the highest local courts, giving
constructions to the laws and constitutions of their own States. It is the
settled rule of this court in such cases, to follow the decisions of State
courts." 6 0
But while remaining "not unmindful" of the general rule that it follow the
state court construction and hold invalid the bonds upon which Gelpcke was
suing, the Supreme Court declined to follow the general rule. Instead, it held
that bonds, valid under judicial decisions outstanding when they were issued,
remained valid and enforceable after those judicial decisions were overruled.
"However we may regard the late [overruling] case in Iowa as affecting the
future," the Court said, "it can have no effect upon the past." 61 The law which
governed the life and validity of the bonds was thus the law at the time they
were issued, not the law as subsequently declared. The underlying thrust was
to say that the overruling opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa would be
considered as having prospective effect only in the federal courts; the over-
ruled decision would continue to be regarded as the governing law by federal
courts until the date of overruling.
Mr. Justice Miller, dissenting, saw the implications of this clearly. He con-
ceded that the "moral force" of the majority's position was "unquestionably
very great,"62 but found that it could not "be sustained either on principle or
authority." 63 His opinion points to principle and authority with Blackstonian
vigor:
58. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
59. See Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487 (1934); HART & SAcxs, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 630-31
(Tent. ed. 1958).
60. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 206.
61. Ibid.
62. Id. at 210.
63. Ibid. See FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 213-21 (1939).
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The Supreme Court of Iowa is not the first or the only court which
has changed its rulings on questions as important as the one now pre-
sented. I understand the doctrine to be in such cases, not that the law is
changed, but that it was always the same as expounded by the later de-
cision, and that the former decision was not, and never had been, the
law, and is overruled for that very reason. The decision of this court con-
travenes this principle, and holds that the decision of the court makes the
law, and in fact, that the same statute or constitution means one thing in
1853, and another thing in 1859. For it is impliedly conceded, that if
these bonds had been issued since the more recent decision of the Iowa
court, this court would not hold them valid. 64
"The decision of the court makes the law"-there was the heart of Gelpcke
as far as Justice Miller's dissent was concerned. The municipal bond cases,
of which Gelpcke was the first, effectively recognized that state courts may
sometimes and for some purposes be regarded as making law prospectively,
much as legislatures do, rather than merely as declaring it retroactively, and
that such regard would particularly be forthcoming when significant reliance
had been placed upon the overruled decisions. 65 As Justice Holmes later said
of Gelpcke, "the principle is that a change of judicial decision after a con-
tract has been made on the faith of an earlier one the other way is a change
of the law."66 And again, "the class of cases to which I refer have not stood
on the ground that this court agreed with the first decision, but on the ground
that the state decision makes the law for the State, and therefore should be
given only a prospective operation when contracts had been entered into under
the law as earlier declared." 67
Subsequent cases continued to stress the reliance which parties had placed
on the only legal guides available at the time they entered a contract or other
transaction.08 Some tried to rationalize the departure from Blackstone and the
64. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 211.
65. The following language is typical:
Parties have a right to contract, and they do contract in view of the law as declared
to them when their engagements are formed. Nothing can justify us in holding them
to any other rule.
Olcott v. The Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 690 (1872).
66. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (dissenting opinion). Jus-
tice Holmes further criticized Gelpcke in Muhlker v. New York & N.R.R.,.197 U.S. 544,
573 (1905).
67. 215 U.S. at 371.
68. See, e.g., Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U.S. 356 (1886) ; Green Cty. v. Conness,
109 U.S. 104 (1883); New Buffalo v. Iron Co., 105 U.S. 73 (1881); Taylor v. Ypsilanti,
105 U.S. 60 (1881) ; Moores v. National Bank, 104 U.S. 625 (1881) ; Railroad Co. v. Mc-
Clure, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 511 (1871) ; The City v. Lamson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 477 (1869) ;
Havemeyer v. Iowa Cty., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294 (1865). See also Hill v. Atlantic & N.C.
R.R., 143 N.C. 539, 55 S.E. 854 (1906) ; Haskeff v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N.E. 358
(1893). Contra, Norton v. Shelby Cty., 118 U.S. 425 (1886). More recent cases include
Sutter Basin Corp. v. Brown, 40 Cal. 2d 235, 253 P.2d 649 (1953) and Reppel v. Board
of Liquidation, 11 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. La. 1935). Cf. Catlett, The Development of the
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declaratory theory along different theoretical lines. Thus, in Douglass v.
County of Pike,69 a municipal bond case similar on its facts to Gelpcke, the
Supreme Court said:
The true rule is to give a change of judicial construction in respect to a
statute the same effect in its operation on contracts and existing contract
rights that would be given to a legislative amendment; that is to say,
make it prospective, but not retroactive. After a statute has been settled
by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract
rights acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as
the text itself, and a change of decision is to all intents and purposes the
same in its effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of
a legislative enactment.70
Criminal and Other Cases
The cases just discussed illustrate departures from the declaratory theory of
the judicial function in order to protect the social values represented by per-
sonal status or commercial arrangements created in reliance upon judicial
decisions subsequently held erroneous. It was almost inevitable that the same
result would occur when even more important values were at stake. An illus-
trative case is State v. Jones.7 The defendant had been prosecuted several
years before under a criminal statute providing penalties for conducting a lot-
tery. The court held that the activity in which he was engaged was not a lot-
tery within the meaning of the statute; accordingly, he was found not guilty.72
The defendant continued to engage in the same activity-sanctioned by the
court's opinion-and was eventually prosecuted a second time under the same
statutory provision. The trial court dismissed on the authority of the earlier
decision. On appeal, the state supreme court changed its former interpretation
of the statute, held that the statute was intended to prohibit activity of the
kind engaged in by the defendant, and overruled the decision in the first
prosecution. 3 But the court declined to apply the overruling decision to the
defendant. "The plainest principles of justice," it said, demand that the former
decision be overruled prospectively; accordingly, "in denying retrospective
operation to our overruling decision, we are governed by the overruled de-
cision in settling the defendant's rights."74
Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should Be Applied, 21 WAsH. L.
REv. 158, 167 (1948).
69. 101 U.S. 677 (1879).
70. Id. at 687.
71. 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
72. Roswell v. Jones, 41 N.M. 258, 67 P.2d 286 (1937).
73. 44 N.M. at 630, 107 P.2d at 329.
74. Id. at 631, 107 P.2d at 329. But see the opinion of Zinn, J., concurring in the over-
ruling but declining to agree with the limitation to prospective application:
To approve their action is to sanction a usurpation by the judiciary of a legis-
lative function. We would not permit the Legislature to encroach upon the domain
assigned exclusively to us by the Constitution of our State. By what right, other
than by a judicial sense of superiority, do we presume to say this shall hereafter be
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The momentum toward prospective overruling may have been unusually
great in the Jones case because of the involvement of the defendant in both
the overruled and the overruling cases: if anyone had a right to rely upon the
first decision it was Jones himself. But the same result has followed in the
more usual criminal cases in which different defendants were involved in the
two decisions. 79 To allow "punishment of an act declared by the highest court
of a state to be innocent, because the same court had seen fit to reverse its
interpretation of a statute," said one court, "would be the very refinement of
cruelty."76
Prospective overruling has also been made use of in cases involving the
creation of a new liability where prior cases had specifically held that no lia-
bility existed.77 A common example is provided by decisions abolishing chari-
table immunity of hospitals in certain tort actions; the abolition is made pro-
spective because it resulted in the enforcement of a duty of care which could
not have been enforced at the time the operative facts occurred.71 Another
example is provided by a case in which the reinterpretation of a state taxation
statute to make taxable that which had previously been held to be nontaxable
was given prospective effect only.79
THE MEANING OF SUNBURST
The technique of prospective overruling was thus not novel when in 1932
the United States Supreme Court was first asked to pass upon its constitu-
tionality in Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.80 A Montana statute
gave the State Railroad Commission authority to fix rates of carriage for in-
trastate shipments, and to change the rates upon a showing that they were
unreasonable. The statute had been interpreted by the Montana Supreme
Court in Doney v. Northern Pac. Ry.81 to authorize a right of reparation in
both carriers and shippers for excesses or deficiencies in payments whenever
the law which heretofore was not the law. To announce a rule of substantive law for
the future is solely the function of the Legislature. If what the majority says is the
law, thenr it has been the law ever since the Legislature passed the lottery law.
Id. at 635-36. 107 P.2d at 338.
75. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904) ; State v. Simanton, 100
Mont. 292, 49 P.2d 981 (1935). Cf. People v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 86 Pac. 187 (1906);
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948).
76. State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 133, 67 So. 902, 903 (1915).
77. Cf. Langdell v. Dodge, 100 N.H. 118, 122 A.2d 529 (1956); Wilson v. Doehler-
Jarvis, 358 Mich. 510, 100 N.W.2d 226 (1960). See also Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
147 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945).
78. See, e.g., Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 26-29, 105 N.W.2d 1, 13-15
(1960). See also Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959).
79. Arizona Tax Comm'n v. Ensign, 75 Ariz. 376, 257 P.2d 392 (1953).
80. 287 U.S. 358 (1932). See Annot., 85 A.L.R. 262 (1933) (collecting cases of pro-
spective overruling prior to Sunburst).
81. 60 Mont. 209, 199 Pac. 432 (1921).
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the rate schedules were annulled or modified because unreasonable. After a
determination that the relevant rates were excessive and unreasonable, Sun-
burst sued Great Northern to recover excess payments. The Supreme Court
of Montana held that the Doney case had been erroneously decided and that
the statute empowering the Commission or a court to invalidate rate schedules
did not create a right of reparation in anyone with respect to charges paid
under the schedule before it was invalidated. The Doney rule was therefore
disavowed. However, because it constituted "the governing principle for ship-
pers and carriers who, during the period of its reign, had acted on the faith
of it,"82 the court elected to adhere to the Doney principle in the case before
it and to allow Sunburst to recover the overpayments it had made to Great
Northern. At the same time the court announced that the rule of the Doney
case was disapproved and would not be followed in the future.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Great
Northern's claim that it was denied due process by the Montana Supreme
Court's disposition of the case. Great Northern's contention was said to be
this: "Adherence to precedent as establishing a governing rule for the past in
respect of the meaning of a statute is ... a denial of due process when coupled
with the declaration of an intention to refuse to adhere to it in adjudicating
any controversies growing out of the transactions of the future.
8 3
The Court held unanimously that it was not; "the federal constitution," it
said, "has no voice upon the subject."' 4 The opinion-fittingly enough because
of his long-held hopes that courts would develop techniques for accommodat-
ing stare decisis to judicial creativity-was written by Justice Cardozo.8 5 The
opinion stressed that the case presented primarily an issue of what judgments
a state court might permissibly make "in defining the limits of adherence to
precedent."8 6 It found either of two alternative approaches within the range
of permissible choice. On the one hand, a state may say what the Montana
court said in the proceedings below, "that decisions of its highest court, though
later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. 87 As to
these transactions, "we may say of the earlier decision that it has not been
overruled at all. It has been translated into a judgment of affirmance and
recognized as law anew."88 That, in effect, was the manner in which Gelpcke
v. Dubuque and its progeny had treated state court decisions.8 9 On the other
hand, a state "may hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its
courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which
event the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been, and
82. 287 U.S. at 361.
83. Id. at 363-64.
84. Id. at 364.
85. See note 30 supra.
86. 287 U.S. at 364.
87. Ibid.
88. Id. at 365.
89. See text at notes 57-70 supra.
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the reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning."0 0 That, in effect, was
what the Court had found constitutional in Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan.9 ' Be-
cause the due process clause does not inhibit a state from making either
choice, the Court said, the "choice for any state may be determined by the
juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its
origin and nature." 92 Montana's choice being a permissible one, the judgment
was affirmed. 93
The usual analysis of Sunburst regards the decision as establishing the
power both of state and federal courts to issue a prospective "prophecy, which
may or may not be realized in conduct, that transactions arising in the future
will be governed by a different rule. ' 94 But as the present analysis suggests,
the Court's central concern was rather with the power of a state court to treat
a precedent in a manner that would honor bona fide reliance and reasonable
expectations. And that problem, surely, was not a difficult one once the Court
had upheld in Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan 95 the retroactive application of new
decisions, thereby making "invalid what was valid in the doing,"'96 in disre-
gard of reliance upon precedent and reasonable expectations as to its dura-
bility.
THE IMPORT OF JAMES V. UNITED STATES
After the decision in Sunburst, the possibility of prospective overruling was
not again to engage the attention of the Supreme Court until the recent de-
cision of James v. United States.97 The defendant was indicted for "wilfully
and knowingly" failing to pay income tax on funds that he had embezzled.
His defense was based upon the holding in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 98 decided
fifteen years earlier, that embezzled funds do not give rise to taxable income.
After James was convicted in the trial court and the conviction was affirmed
on appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A majority of six members of the Court voted to overrule Wilcox and hold
that embezzled funds constitute taxable income. 99 A differently constituted
majority of six voted to reverse the conviction-three on the ground that since
James' actions took place during the period in which Wilcox was not yet over-
ruled, the statutory requirement of "willful" evasion could not be proved ;100
and three others on the ground that Wilcox had been properly decided on the
90. 287 U.S. at 365.
91. 263 U.S. 444 (1924). For a discussion of this case, see text at notes 13-14 supra.
92. 287 U.S. at 365.
93. Id. at 367.
94. Id. at 366.
95. 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
96. 287 U.S. at 364.
97. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
98. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
99. The six members were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Har-
lan, Brennan, and Stewart.
100. The three were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Stewart.
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merits and should be a bar to prosecution in James.1' 1 One Justice voted to
affirm the conviction,10 2 and the remaining two voted to remand the case to
the district court for a new trial. 1
0 3
The opinion of Chief Justice Warren, which announced the judgment of the
Court that Wilcox be overruled and the conviction of James be reversed,
makes no explicit mention of prospective overruling, but centers on the neces-
sity for proof of the "evil motive and want of justification in view of all the
circumstances' 0 4 which willfulness legally implies. It reversed the conviction
because of the belief "that the element of willfulness could not be proven in
a criminal prosecution for failing to include embezzled funds in gross income
in the year of misappropriation so long as the statute contained the gloss
placed upon it by Wilcox at the time the alleged crime was committed."'u0
Read in the broadest sense, the opinion would seem to suggest that James
should have prospective effect only, and that Wilcox should govern all tax-
payer conduct until the date of decision in James.0 6 Read more narrowly, the
opinion would seem to suggest that James must be prospective at least with
respect to criminal prosecutions, since the requisite willfulness could not be
present prior to the date of decision in James, but that retroactive civil actions
requiring no proof of willfulness might perhaps permissibly be based upon the
holding in James. On either reading, however, the Chief Justice's approach
results in the prospective announcement of a new rule of criminal liability. It
may be fair to suggest that had the possibility of this partial prospective over-
ruling not been available, the necessity of making the new ruling retroactive
with respect to criminal prosecutions might have led the Chief Justice to fol-
low prior cases in affirming or further distinguishing the holding in Wilcox.
1 7
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black announces his conviction that
"Wilcox was sound when written and is sound now."' 0 8 In addition to a dis-
cussion on the merits of overruling Wilcox, the opinion marshals an argu-
ment against "the prospective way in which this is done."' 0 9 The gravamen
of the argument is that the availability of prospective overruling is an invita-
tion to courts to overreach the limits of judicial power and undertake to do
what only a legislature may constitutionally do.
101. The three were Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker.
102. He was Mr. Justice Clark.
103. The two were Justices Harlan and Frankfurter.
104. 366 U.S. at 221.
105. Id. at 221-22.
106. But cf. The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1961), argu-
ing that a "definitive answer to this question apparently must await a subsequent decision
of the Court." No hint of an answer is provided by Rev. Rul. 61-185, 1961 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 42. See also Beck v. United States, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1962).
107. See, e.g., Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) ; J.J. DLx, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 223 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 894 (1955) ; Marienfeld v. United
States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 913 (1955) ; United States v. Wyss, 239 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1957).




The argument of Mr. Justice Black begins with a recitation of the fact that
Wilcox authoritatively held that the relevant statutory language in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code did not impose a tax upon embezzled income. It continues:
The Wilcox case was decided fifteen years ago. Congress has met every
year since then. All of us know that the House and Senate Committees
responsible for our tax laws keep a close watch on judicial rulings inter-
preting the Internal Revenue Code. Each committee has one or more
e.xperts at its constant disposal. It cannot possibly be denied that these
committees and these experts are, and have been, fully familiar with the
Wilcox holding. When Congress is dissatisfied with a tax decision of this
Court, it can and frequently does act very quickly to overturn it. 10
Moreover, he adds, the Internal Revenue Code was "completely overhauled
and recodified" in 1954, after the Wilcox decision, and it left that decision
intact." ' ' Finally, repeated attempts to subject embezzled funds to income
taxation have been defeated; this is not, therefore, a case in which Congress
failed to change the law "because it did not know what was going on in the
courts or because it was not asked to do so .... 1112 When the Court changed
by judicial decision a statutory interpretation which Congress knew of for
fifteen years and left standing for fifteen years, it "passed beyond the inter-
pretation of the tax statute and proceeded substantially to amend it."" 3 The
thrust of this argument would appear to be that the first judicial interpretation
of a statute gives a possibly ambiguous phrase a settled meaning and that any
change in that meaning should be made by-the legislature, particularly where
the legislature can be said to have acquiesced in the substance of the judicial
interpretation. For a court to change that meaning in such circumstances, in
other words, is for it to amend a statute which Congress has declined to
amend." 4 And such amendment, the opinion contends, may be particularly
pernicious when it involves, in effect, the "creation" of a new crime. The
opinion adds:
[F]or a court to interpret a criminal statute in such a way as to make
punishment for past conduct under it so unfair and unjust that the in-
terpretation should be given only prospective application seems to us to
be the creation of a judicial crime that Congress might not want to
create."15
110. Id. at 230-31.
111. Id. at 231.
112. Id. at 231-32. See the comments of Justice Stone in connection with the Sherman
Act:
The long time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially con-
strued, and the enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes
the judicial construction as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the
judicial construction is the correct one.
Ape. Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940).
113. 366 U.S. at 224.
114. Compare Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), with Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946). Cf. United States v. Girouard, 149 F.2d 760,
765 (1st Cir. 1945) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
115. 366 U.S. at 224-25.
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Mr. Justice Black then reaches the heart of the matter: the availability of
the technique of prospective overruling, by offering a court the means of
avoiding the often unpleasant consequences of retroactivity, encourages it
when interpreting a statute to make law, not in the acceptable and inevitable
judicial sense in which courts make law but in the unacceptable legislative
sense in which legislatures make law.116 The unavailability of prospective
overruling is thus viewed as a safeguard against inappropriate, because un-
authorized, judicial action.117 In Mr. Justice Black's statement of it:
[O]ne of the great inherent restraints upon this Court's departure from
the field of interpretation to enter that of lawmaking has been the fact
that its judgments could not be limited to prospective application. This
Court and in fact all departments of the Government have always here-
tofore realized that prospective lawmaking is the function of Congress
rather than of the courts. We continue to think that this function should
be exercised only by Congress under our constitutional system."18
Mr. Justice Harlan, conceding that Wilcox was wrongly decided, addresses
his attention to fashioning an appropriate method of overruling it.119 He starts
with the assumption that "our decisions in the tax and any other field for
that matter relate back to the actual transactions with which they are con-
cerned, and that that is only the normal concomitant of the fact that we do
not sit as an administrative agency making rulings for the future, but rather
adjudicate actual controversies as to rights and liabilities under the laws of
the United States.' 1 20 Even conceding that Wilcox is wrong, therefore, an
"outright reversal"'121 of the conviction could not be reconciled with the view
that the interpretation of an unchanged statute must "relate back" to the time
of enactment. But Mr. Justice Harlan suggests that James should be able to
secure a reversal if he had in fact relied upon the holding in Wilcox and
therefore lacked the willfulness required for conviction.122 This would be a
question of fact to be decided at a new trial in the district court; it should
not be decided on appeal either in favor of the defendant, as the opinion of
Chief Justice Warren decided it, or against the defendant, as the opinion of
Mr. Justice Clark decided it. If bona fide reliance upon Wilcox could not be
demonstrated, then the principle of relation back would govern and would
116. Cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226-27 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
117. Values of stare decisis are, of course, also relevant here. See generally Douglas,
Stare Decisis, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 735 (1949) ; Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL
L.Q. 137 (1946) ; Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FoRaDH L. Rxv. 1 (1941) ; Lob-
ingier, Precedent in Past and Present Legal Systems, 44 MicH. L. REV. 955 (1946) ; Ellen-
bogen, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should be Applied, 20
TEMPLE L.Q. 503 (1947).
118. 366 U.S. at 225.
119. Id. at 241.
120. Id. at 244-45.
121. Ibid.
122. Id. at 245.
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make the ruling in James applicable. 123 This allowance of reliance as a defense
would also seem to meet constitutional objections centering upon the lack of
adequate notice.124
The opinions of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan in the James
case were apparently the first in the Supreme Court to suggest that prospec-
tive overruling raised problems of constitutional significance. Yet neither
opinion undertook an analysis of the significance of these problems. Mr. Jus-
tice Black alone cited Sunburst, and for the imprecise proposition that "[w] e
realize that there is a doctrine with wide support to the effect that under some




The assumption that the holding of Sunburst applies to the federal courts
and sanctions their authority to speak prospectively had been made prior to
James by at least two Justices of the United States Supreme Court. In Mosser
v. Darrow,126 the Court held that a reorganization trustee who expressly per-
mitted key employees to profit from trading in securities of the trust was per-
sonally liable for profits realized by these employees. Although conceding that
"there is no hint or proof that he [the trustee] has been corrupt or that he has
any interest, present or future, in the profits he has permitted these employees
to make,"' 27 the Court held that good faith was not a defense and found that
the "most effective sanction for good administration is personal liability for the
123. A second possible defense-that "at the time he failed to make his return [James]
was not under any misapprehension as to the law, but indeed that at the time and under
the decisions of this Court his view of the law was entirely correct"-Mr. Justice Harlan
suggests only to reject:
Petitioner's obligation here derived not from the decisions of this or any other court,
but from the Act of Congress imposing the tax. It is hard to see what further point
is being made, once it is conceded that petitioner, if he was misled by the decisions
of this Court, is entitled to plead in defense that misconception. Only in the most
metaphorical sense has the law changed: the decisions of this Court have changed,
and the decisions of a court interpreting the acts of a legislature have never been
subject to the same limitations which are imposed on legislatures themselves ...
forbidding them to make any ex post facto law ....
366 U.S. at 247.
124. See text at notes 21-23 supra. The opinion of Mr. Justice Black in James says:
[A] criminal statute that is so ambiguous in scope that an interpretation of it brings
about totally unexpected results, thereby subjecting people to penalties and punish-
ments for conduct which they could not know was criminal under existing law, raises
serious questions of unconstitutional vagueness.
366 U.S. at 224. See also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960) ; Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV.
40, 62-64 (1961) ; United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
125. 366 U.S. at 224.
126. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
127. Id. at 275.
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consequences of forbidden acts . . ,,128 Mr. Justice Black dissented.129 Be-
cause the "rule of trustee liability [now announced by the Court] did not exist
before today," he found "grossly unfair" its retroactive application to a trustee
who could not have known that his conduct was subject to such a rule.130
Despite its novelty, there is much to be said in favor of such a rule for
cases arising in the future. It seems to me, however, that there is no
reason why the rule should be retroactively applied to this respondent,
when to do so is grossly unfair. Admittedly, the most that can be said
against respondent is that he made an honest mistake which before today
would not have subjected him to the heavy financial penalty. Under these
circumstances, if the new rule is to be announced by the Court, I think
it should be given prospective application only. See Great Northern R.
Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co ..... 131
Another statement, also relying upon Sunburst, was made by Mr. justice
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois.132 The case in-
volved a challenge to the constitutionality of an Illinois statute which governed
the procedure by which the state provided appellate review of criminal con-
victions. In order to obtain appellate review a defendant was required to fur-
nish the appellate court with a bill of exceptions or with a report of the pro-
ceedings at the trial certified by the trial judge. Often such documents could
be prepared only if the defendant had access to a stenographic transcript of
the trial proceedings. Although the state furnished a free transcript to any
person appealing from a sentence of death, indigent defendants who wished
to appeal from less severe sentences were required to pay for the transcript
themselves or to forego the opportunity to appeal. Griffin was denied an ap-
peal from a conviction for armed robbery because of financial inability to buy
a transcript. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that once a state provides
for appellate review and makes that review "an integral part" of its "trial
system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,"'13 it
may not condition access to that review upon the financial ability or status of
the defendant. The Court ruled that the state was required either to furnish
a transcript to every indigent defendant who wished to appeal or to make
other arrangements for affording adequate and effective appellate review to
indigent defendants, assuming in each instance that the state desires to con-
tinue providing some form of judicial review. The cause was remanded for
further action not inconsistent with the opinion.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the disposition of the case, wrote a
separate opinion. He agreed that the procedure under the Illinois rule amounted
128. Id. at 274.
129. Id. at 275.
130. Id. at 275-76.
131. Id. at 276. But see Mr. Justice Black's later view that "prospective lawmaldng is
the function of Congress rather than of the courts." James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213,
225 (1961). See text at notes 108-18 supra.
132. 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956).
133. Id. at 18.
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to "squalid discrimination"' 34 and that if a state "has a general policy of al-
lowing criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means an effective bar to the
exercise of this opportunity."'135 Having announced his agreement with the
substantive judgment of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter then embarked
upon a discussion of the nature of the law which had been newly declared.
While agreeing that Griffin should be given the opportunity to appeal, he
urged that the Court should have specifically limited its ruling to prospective
application because "candor compels acknowledgment that the decision ren-
dered today is a new ruling" and, for "sound reasons, law generally speaks
prospectively."' 13 6 The operative significance of such an application would be
to deny writs of habeas corpus to presently-incarcerated prisoners who were
precluded from obtaining judicial review of their convictions because of their
inability to purchase a transcript. The application of the new rule prospective-
ly only, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded, "is consonant with the spirit of
our law and justified by those considerations of reason which should dominate
the law . . . ,'137 citing the Sunburst case.
It should be noted that the action urged by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Griffin differed significantly-even more significantly than Mosser v. Darrow
did-from the action taken by the state court in Sunburst. His opinion in
Griffin would not postpone application of the new rule to the next case, as
the state court had in Sunburst, but instead would apply the new rule in the
case before him. Since Mr. Justice Frankfurter was not engaging in "future
prophecies alone," his opinion cannot be cited in support of the usual inter-
pretation of Sunburst.
The litigation in the Sunburst case brought to the Supreme Court the
limited question of whether the use of prospective overruling by a state su-
preme court denied a party due process under the fourteenth amendment. The
decision was that it did not. The case did not in any way raise on its facts the
complex question of whether the use of prospective overruling by a federal
court-bound as a state court is not by the strict requirements of Article III
-was constitutionally permissible. 13  This constitutional question is of a dif-
ferent order from the question raised by the facts in Sunburst. At least it is
far from clear that the same result should follow in the one case as in the
134. Id. at 24.
135. Ibid.
136. Id. at 25-26.
137. Id. at 26.
138. Professor Davis finds judicial power to overrule prospectively "inherent!" and
"intrinsic" in all courts. 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.09, at 352 and n.18
(1958).
Professor Moore says:
As far as state courts are concerned the United States Constitution neither precludes
nor compels the prospective-effect approach. And, while a federal constitutional
court cannot render an advisory opinion, the same view should prevail in the federal
courts for the following reasons. The overruling decision is rendered in an actual
controversy between adverse parties. The fact that a former decision is overruled,
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other.13 9 The question merits an independent analysis that the cases have neg-
lected to give it.
ARTICLE III AND PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING
Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the federal
courts "to all Cases" and "to Controversies." That the exercise of this power
must be limited to the resolution of actual and concrete cases and controver-
sies-and may not be brought to bear upon abstract and hypothetical ques-
tions, however great their interest-has been a ruling constitutional principle
at least since Marbury v. Madison.
140
As Professor Bickel has written of this limit upon federal courts:
It follows that courts may make no pronouncements in the large and in
the abstract, by way of opinions advising other departments upon re-
quest; that they may give no opinions, even in a concrete case, which are
advisory because they are not finally decisive, the power of ultimate dis-
position of the case having been reserved elsewhere; and that they may
not decide non-cases, which are not adversary situations and in which
nothing of immediate consequence to the parties turns on the results.1 '
In short, the power of a federal court under Article III to make authoritative
determinations and declarations of law derives solely from its power to decide
cases. And a court's holding in the decision of a case is entitled to binding
effect as a pronouncement of law only to the extent that the rules of law held
to govern were necessary to the resolution of the conflict presented. But
whether a federal court has paid appropriate respect to the injunctions of
Article III should not rest finally upon a literal inquiry into whether a par-
ticular statement in a judicial opinion is necessary to the decision of the case,
or whether the decision on the facts could nonetheless stand without it. Larger
considerations are at play here, considerations which relate to the service
which Article III renders to a system based upon the separation of govern-
mental powers.
but without retroactive effect, indicates a careful and thoughtful evaluation of the
correct legal doctrines involved. The prospective application of the overruling de-
cision is merely a product of the case or controversy presented.
1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 4082-84 (2d ed. 1959).
139. But see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1960).
The Sunburst case came up from the state courts but I see no reason to suppose that
a different result would be reached in a federal, constitutionally established court
.... And since federal courts have frequently asserted judicial power to overrule,
why should not they prospectively overrule; the greater includes the lesser.
Id. at 15 n.48.
140. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Although Marbury v. Madison may be read as
a limitation only upon judicial review of the actions of other branches of government, its
rationale has been broadened to become a general jurisdictional limitation on the actions
of federal courts in all cases.
141. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HAgv. L. REv. 40, 42 (1961).
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As Marbury v. Madison made dear, preservation of the concept of separa-
tion of powers embodied in the Constitution requires that the Supreme Court
in certain circumstances review the actions of the legislative and executive
branches of the government. If judicial review is a constitutional necessity,
however, invocation of this ultimate power by men who in the literal sense
are irresponsible remains tolerable only so long as that power governs no more
than necessity strictly dictates. And adherence to the limitations and prohibi-
tions of Article III represents one means of insuring that binding judicial de-
cisions are not made until the branches of government which are directly
accountable to the people have had an opportunity to pass upon the issues
involved. For as Thayer a half-century ago reminded us:
[T]he tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function [of
judicial review], now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political
capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.1 42
Article III can thus be said to embody a rationale which seeks-for rea-
sons which search the essence of the separation of powers-to make it diffi-
cult for courts to pass judgment upon decisions of other branches of govern-
ment by establishing strict limits to the exercise of judicial power.143 To the
degree that the preservation of these policies is deemed important, Article
III should be given a construction which limits the power of federal courts
to disturb or to deny the validity of statutes or actions of other branches of
government.
When it is subjected to this kind of interpretation, Article III appears as a
symbolic vehicle for carrying the freight of judicial abstention-even, as it
were, a "benevolent fiction." The final authority of a court rests upon public
respect for its decisions. That public respect, which ultimately enables federal
courts to pass judgment upon the acts of its partners in government is based,
however, upon an image which represents courts as declaring legal principles
with an authority and certainty that cannot be expected from! legislatures when
they make law on an experimental, trial-and-error basis. The public image
which sustains the unique powers of a federal court is thus not strikingly
different from the image which possessed Blackstone; both images bespeak
an uneasiness about a court making law. The doctrines of judicial abstention
which are mirrored in Article III may thus be viewed as a means for preserving
public respect for the judiciary by deterring courts from making pronouncements
of law except in those cases where the constitutional duty cannot be avoided.14 4
Thus, although the realist jurisprudence may have laid to rest the fiction
that judges merely find the law which legislatures make, the crucial need in
142. THAYER, JoHx MAusHAI.t 106-07 (1901).
143. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) ; Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911).
144. See generally Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40
(1961).
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a democracy to limit the exercise of judicial review provides the rationale for
a view of the case and controversy requirements of Article III that would
seem to conflict as much as the Blackstonian view had with the rationale un-
derlying prospective overruling. For prospective overruling is designed to
make it easier-not more difficult-for a court to strike down the action of a
legislature or to reverse its own prior decision of which the legislature had
been aware. Indeed, a central argument usually advanced for the use of pro-
spective overruling is that it will encourage courts to change the law in situa-
tions where the consequences of retroactivity would otherwise discourage such
a change.145 To the degree that a purpose of Article III is to discourage courts
from making changes in the law when legislatures are as capable of making
the changes, prospective overruling should be regarded as within its prohibi-
tory intent. And although Article III is usually regarded as imposing limita-
tions only upon judicial review of the actions of coordinate branches of the
federal government, its rationale would seem to counsel similar limitations
upon federal judicial review of the actions of state governments. 4 6
The relevance of these propositions about Article III and prospective over-
ruling can be illustrated by brief reference to the four opinions discussed above
-those of Justice Cardozo in Sunburst, Mr. Justice Black in Mosser, Mr.
justice Frankfurter in Griffin, and Chief Justice Warren in James.
In Sunburst, justice Cardozo was passing upon the action of a state court
in applying the holding of a prior case to the resolution of the factual con-
flict before it and simultaneously announcing that the case was overruled and
would not be followed in the future. The precise decision in the case before
the state court was, therefore, that the rule of the prior case must be followed.
Under the analysis suggested here, the application of that rule to the facts in
dispute would mark the limit of the constitutional power of a federal court
under Article III. The announcement that the rule of the prior case would
henceforth be considered overruled----"a prophecy, which may or may not be
realized in conduct, that transactions arising in the future will be governed by
a different rule,"1' 47 as Justice Cardozo put it-would be beyond the authority
of a federal court because it would not represent a pronouncement of law
derived from the case or controversy before it.
The opinion of Mr. justice Black in Mosser would be susceptible to the
same analysis: a federal court would be held to lack the constitutional power
145. See articles cited at notes 28-29 supra.
146. The view that state governments should be allowed to function as laboratories
for social experimentation-free from federal judicial intervention except in "shocking"
cases of the denial of substantive rights-was, of course, central to the thinking of Justices
Brandeis and Holmes. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). This view underlies the line of cases, beginning with Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), which marked the decline of substantive due process with
respect to rights without a claim to a preferred position in the constitutional hierarchy.
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937) ; Note, 70 YALa LJ. 322 (1960).
147. 287 U.S. at 366.
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to announce a new rule of fiduciary duty at the same time that it applied a
different and discarded rule to the resolution of the case and controversy be-
fore it. These two opinions thus represent attempts at prospective overruling
in a manner which when done by federal courts must be held to raise serious
Article III problems.
The opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Griffin and of Chief Justice
Warren in James, however, are different in a significant way; each would
apply the newly-announced rule to the facts before the Court, while adding
some general statements about how subsequent cases will or should be treated.
The resolution of the actual case and controversy in Griffin, under Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's approach, would involve the application of the new rule to its
facts; Griffin would be provided with a free stenographic transcript of the
trial proceedings in his case if he could not afford to pay for it himself. Sim-
ilarly, Chief Justice Warren would apparently apply the new rule that em-
bezzled income is taxable to the defendant James, although finding that an-
other element necessary for conviction, willfulness, was lacking still. Both
opinions apply the new rule to the facts before the Court. The announcement
of the new rule in such circumstances means that it becomes intimately bound
up with the decision of a case and controversy. In a literal sense, it is decisive
of that case and controversy.
In summary, then, a state court, after fashioning a new rule, may apply it:
(1) to conduct occurring subsequent to the announcement only; (2) to con-
duct occurring subsequent to the announcement and also to the present liti-
gants; or (3) to conduct occurring subsequent to the announcement, to the
present litigants, and also to conduct which occurred prior to the announce-
ment. For a federal court, however, the choice is more limited: Article III
forecloses selection of the first alternative; but it "has no voice" as to selection
between the other two.148 Before making this selection, a federal court must
determine whether the decision as to retroactivity should be made in the case
in which the new rule is announced or should be deferred to a subsequent
case in which a party seeks application of the new rule to prior conduct.
Once this decision is made, it becomes necessary to identify criteria relevant
to choice.
WHEN TO DECIDE RETROACTMTY
"The most important thing we do," said justice Brandeis, "is not doing."149
His statement was a shorthand method of expressing one of the abiding
themes of his judicial thought: that the Supreme Court should avoid precipi-
148. Of course the choice for a federal court may be more limited even with respect
to these two alternatives if the change in law has not been made by the court itself, but
instead has been made by a change in a treaty, constitution, or statute, or by decision of
another court. That is the teaching of such cases as Schooner Peggy, Chambers, and
Vandenbark. See text at notes 34-51 supra.
149. Conversation with Felix Franldurter, manuscript on file at Harvard Law School
Library; quoted in BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF Ma. JUSTICE BRANDES 1,
17 (1957).
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tate decision of constitutional issues, and that it should decide such issues
only when it is unable otherwise to dispose of a case properly before it.150
This is more than merely a formal statement of the jurisdictional fact that a
federal court acts beyond its Article III powers when it decides something
other than an actual "case" or "controversy." It is also a statement which
justifies that jurisdictional fact by at least two important results which flow
from a strict regard for it.
First, judicial insistence upon deciding only "cases" and "controversies" in
the constitutional sense and avoiding decision in hypothetical noncases is a
method of insuring that courts have before them the most complete and de-
veloped record possible before they render a decision.' 5 ' Similarly, insistence
upon truly adverse parties, aware crucially that the issue has been joined in
a way that now permits of resolution nowhere in the system but in the courts
and that resolution is a pressing present need, offers an assurance that courts
will be provided with more complete and adequate factual records. And the
more developed the record which the court has before it, the greater the like-
lihood that a wise and fair decision will result.152
Second, judicial insistence upon resolving conflicts only when they cannot
be resolved appropriately by any other authority in the system is a method of
insuring that in a democracy full recourse will be had to the political branches
of government before judicial intervention is available.15 3 If it is true, as
de Tocqueville said, that in the United States all political questions eventually
become judicial questions, 1 4 it may also be true that many political questions,
when attempt is first made to bring them to courts, are still considerably dis-
tant from being judicial questions. When this difference is made apparent to
"the expert feel of lawyers,"'I a court encourages legislative and executive
responsibility by refusing to provide the parties a resolution of their conflict
so long as other, more representative bodies remain available for petition.
These considerations and the statement of Justice Brandeis which prompted
them, relate not only to the decision of whether a court should declare the
150. See BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIo Ns OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 2-3 (1957).
Cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928) (Brandeis, J.) ;
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
151. Cf. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 503 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
152. See Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1002 (1924).
153. In Professor Frankfurter's words:
Perhaps the most costly price of advisory opinions is the weakening of legislative
and popular responsibility. It is not merely the right of the legislature to legislate;
it is its duty .... It must be remembered that advisory opinions are not merely
advisory opinions. They are ghosts that slay.
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002, 1007-08 (1924).
154. See 1 DE TocgtunvrLE, DEmOcRACY IN AmERIcA 306 (4th ed. 1841).




existence of a case or controversy which it may appropriately entertain; they
also relate to the discretionary decision of whether a court, having announced
a new rule, should join to that announcement a statement on whether or not
the new rule will be retroactively applied. Thus, the decision of whether to
make an announcement with respect to retroactivity becomes, in these circum-
stances, almost precisely a decision as to whether the issue of retroactivity has
been presented to the court as-and not merely in association with-an actual
case or controversy. In wide measure the same reasons-recited above-which
at once justify and limit the court in hearing a question in the first place also
justify and limit it in hearing the companion question of retroactivity. 156
The question of the retroactivity of a specific judicial decision should be
decided on the same conditions as all other questions decided by federal
courts: only when presented in a factual posture which can appropriately be
termed a case or controversy in the constitutional sense. In deciding wisely
when to rule upon retroactivity, a court can encourage the subsequent fram-
ing of the issue in more precise factual terms and can abide the resolution of
it until other "departments," in Judge Hand's probing archaism, 157 have had
an opportunity to meet it, perhaps in a manner to make judicial review un-
necessary.'58 A court's use of deliberate silence about the retroactive effect of
156. In many cases there will be no necessity for a court to indicate whether or not
its decision is retroactive because any retroactive rights that might be granted would be
incapable of enforcement. For example, § 6(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 780 (1958), denies to members of Communist organizations
the right to apply for, to use, or to renew a United States passport. It is not unlikely that
if a court test is had, the statute will be declared unconstitutional. Cf. The Supreme Court,
1960 Trmn, 75 HAzv. L. REv. 80, 111 (1961). If the Court were to announce that its de-
cision were retroactive, such a declaration would not seem capable of having any operative
consequences. Assuming a plaintiff who, prior to the decision, had been denied a passport
under the invalid provision and who could prove the damages resulting from the denial,
there does not appear to be any federal statute authorizing suit. To declare such a decision
retroactive would therefore be to declare a right which has no remedy.
Similarly, the Hill-Burton Act of 1944, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1958),
which provides federal funds to assist the states in the construction of public and other
nonprofit hospitals in accordance with federally-approved plans, specifically declares that
a state plan providing for hospital facilities which are racially "separate but equal" shall
not on that ground be denied approval. 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) (1958). Because "separate but
equal" facilities have been held unconstitutional in so many other areas of United States
life, it is likely that, when judicially tested, they may be held unconstitutional in hospitals
supported by federal and state funds. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1962, p. 1, col. 4, reporting
the bringing of suits to test the statute's constitutionality. But even if such a holding were
declared to be retroactive, it is nearly inconceivable that the federal government would
be successful in a suit against a state for recovery of federal funds already spent by the
state under the invalid statutory authorization: the equities of reliance are weighted much
too unevenly to allow that result. In both of these cases, the question of whether the court's
declaration of unconstitutionality could or would be retroactive or not is, therefore, in
consequential terms, of no real meaning at all.
157. See generally HAND, THE Bmz. oF RiGHTS (1958); see also Learned Hand, 71
YALE L.J. 108 (1961).
158. See, e.g., the opinion to the President of Attorney General Homer Cummings as
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a judicial decision should be regarded as another technique of declining juris-
diction in the cause of institutional competence; in short-a passive virtue.0 0
The Durham Case
I A case which is particularly instructive on several aspects of this problem
is Durham v. United States,60 in which the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia supplemented the existing rule with a new rule for the deter-
mination of insanity in criminal cases. "[I]n adopting a new test," the court
said, "we invoke our inherent power to make the change prospectively."''
Perhaps this qualification of the reach in time of the Durham rule was neces-
sary tactically in order to secure approval from a sufficient number of mem-
bers of the court for such a significant change in the law. But however neces-
sary it was tactically, the qualification remains questionable for several rea-
sons.
First, after the court had decided that the new rule should be applied to the
facts in Durham upon remand, any further announcement of how the rule
would be applied to other fact situations not before the court was unnecessary
to the decision and was therefore premature.162
Second, if the rule was denied retroactive effect only because of fears that
the courts would be burdened administratively by an overwhelming number
of petitions for writs of habeas corpus from persons convicted after being
found sane under the M'Naghten rule, these fears were based upon no more
than a guess. Assuming arguendo that an excessive burden upon the adminis-
tration of the courts is a valid reason for prospective decision-making, the
reality of such a burden could best have been determined by waiting to see
how many petitions were filed in how concentrated a period of time. If the
number filed were awesome, then the same result of denying retroactivity
could have been announced in a subsequent case. If the number filed were
manageable, then the announcement denying retroactivity was unnecessary on
to whether West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), would have retroactive effect. 39 Ops. ATr'Y GEN.
22 (1937), reprinted in FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HowE & BROWN, CONSTITUTioNAL LAW
111-12 (2d ed. 1961).
159. See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HAv. L. REv. 40 (1961).
160. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
161. Id. at 874 (citing cases).
162. It may be argued that because the Court of Appeals in Durham reversed the
defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial on the ground that the prevailing M'Naghten
rule for determining insanity had been misapplied by the trial court, any additional state-
ment about what rule to apply in the future was prospective overruling of the kind pro-
hibited to federal courts by Article III. However, even if this is a permissible reading of
the case, the federal courts of the District of Columbia are regarded as state courts, not
bound by the case and controversy requirements of Article III, when they hear cases not
based upon federal statutes of national applicability. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). The problems raised by the textual discussion of Durham remain
relevant to all federal courts.
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these grounds and may have deprived deserving petitioners of the benefit of
the new rule.
033
Third, if the Court of Appeals had been silent in Durham upon the retro-
active effect of the new rule, the issue of retroactivity would first have been
raised in the trial courts of the District of Columbia,0 4 where it could have
been fully briefed and argued, as it apparently was not in Durham. Adversary
litigation directed solely to the question of retroactivity would probably have
developed for the court both the necessities and the injustices of prospective
application of the new rule. The court would then have had more detailed
evidence upon which to base its decision on retroactivity.
Fourth, by choosing to make the announcement of prospectivity in the
Durham case, the court in effect deprived itself of the opportunity to have be-
fore it specific cases which might place a severe strain on the sense of injustice
created by denying retroactive application. At least it is possible that in many
cases retroactive application would seem not only desirable, all factors con-
sidered, but even equitably mandatory. Effectuation of this possibility-that
the Durham rule might be applied most equitably on a case-by-case basis-
the court foreclosed by its premature announcement. 65
In summary, Durham seems a case in which the uses of silence would have
been appropriate and, indeed, fruitful. The result of silence could have been
a decision upon retroactive application made in the context of actual cases and
upon actual facts. Perhaps under the tension of such objectified claims to ret-
roactivity, the position eventually reached would have been wiser because less
sweeping and because more related to the facts of given cases.
163. Moreover, retroactive application of the new rule could not be uniform because
the procedural posture of many of the cases which would subsequently come before the
court would compel retroactivity. For example, those cases in which the crime was com-
mitted before the crime in Durham but which came to trial after the decision in Durham
would be governed-in effect retroactively-by Durham. This means that chance alone
would control the inevitable retroactive application. See text at notes 34-51 .supra.
164. However, this referral of the decision as to retroactivity to the lower courts for
initial judgment will be useful for higher courts only if the lower court judges attempt to
deal realistically with the issues involved. It will be rendered of insignificant value if the
lower court judges reach their decision as to retroactivity by a lexicographical analysis of
the diction and verb tenses of the overruling opinion in a search for its intent. That this
happens may be seen from two recent cases applying Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See People v. Figuero, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 1050, 2158 (N.Y. Cty. Court, Kings Cty., Sept.
30, 1961), and Hall v. Warden, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2360 (D. Md. 1962). See also People
v. Ryan, 152 Cal. 364, 92 Pac. 853 (1907) ; Johnson v. Stoveken, 52 N.J. Super. 460, 145
A.2d 801 (1958); State v. Long, 177 A.2d 609 (Essex Cty. Ct., N.J., Jan. 24, 1962),
relying upon "the rationale of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals in War-
ring v. Colpoys," discussed in text at notes 174-85 infra.
165. For instance, it is not inconceivable that habeas corpus would be denied to those
who conceded the issue of insanity at trial, but granted to those who contested it. Other
criteria for treating different petitioners in different manners, depending upon the totality
of the circumstances in each individual case, are not difficult to imagine. The point is that
courts are more likely to think in terms of these criteria when actual cases demand con-
sideration of them than when they are making abstract determinations as to retroactivity
vel non. That is one of the lessons of the remand in Grifin. See text at notes 166-67 infra.
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The Griffin Case
A second case which is instructive for these purposes, although for different
reasons, is Griffin v. Illinois.166 In that case the Supreme Court held that if
a state conditioned judicial review in criminal cases upon the furnishing to
an appellate court of a stenographic transcript of the trial, it must furnish such
transcripts at state expense to defendants who cannot afford them. The case
was remanded to the state court for application of the new principle. In thus
disposing of the case, the Court abstained from deciding the questions not
presented by the facts in Griffin of whether the new rule should be applied
retroactively to persons presently imprisoned. Its judgment in abstaining was
proved wise by subsequent events.
Upon remand, the Supreme Court of Illinois amended its court rule and
announced that transcripts would be furnished at state expense to all indigent
prisoners, regardless of whether they were sentenced prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin and regardless of whether they had pursued post-
conviction remedies in which they might have raised the issue ultimately pre-
sented and decided in Griffin.16 7 The state decision was made with a sophis-
ticated awareness of the variety of circumstances on the basis of which a claim
of retroactivity could be made, an awareness which might well have been ab-
sent from a sweeping pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court on
the issue of retroactivity. The effect of the state court's decision was to make
unnecessary, at least with respect to Illinois, a determination by a federal court
of whether Griffin should be applied retroactively. In this particular case, that
determination was made unnecessary because the state court decided upon
remand that it would apply the free-transcript rule retroactively. If the state
rule had not been changed in this manner, presumably lower federal courts
would have had to determine in the first instance whether Griffin should be
applied retroactively; and these lower court determinations eventually would
have reached the United States Supreme Court. However, in making its de-
cision upon retroactivity at that point, the Supreme Court would have been
able to consider the reasoning in the lower court's opinion or perhaps in con-
flicting opinions in cases coming from different lower courts. Such an oppor-
tunity may increase the likelihood that as many arguments and grounds of
reasoning as possible will be before the Court when it makes its decision, and
this likelihood may increase the quality of the decisions which result.167a
166. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
167. People v. Griffin, 9 Ill. 2d 164, 137 N.E.2d 485 (1956) (Schaeffer, J.). But see
People v. Berman, 19 Ill. 2d 579, 169 N.E.2d 108 (1960).
167a. It should be noted, however, that at least one serious question is raised by the
suggestion that the United States Supreme Court postpone the decision as to the retro-
activity of a new rule until it has before it a group of conflicting, well-considered opinions
by lower federal courts. In a case like Mapp v. Ohio, conflicting lower court opinions
might mean that some prisoners would have been granted habeas corpus and been released,
while others would have been denied habeas corpus and been retained in prison, by the time




When the issue of retroactivity is properly a part of the case and contro-
versy before the court, it should of course be decided. And, as important, it
should be decided in a reasoned opinion which explains the factors that com-
pelled the result. An example of a case in which the United States Supreme
Court avoided this duty is Eskridge v. Washington State Board,168 the case
which first presented the Court with the question of whether to apply Griffin
retroactively.1 9 Eskridge was convicted of murder in 1935 and was prevented
at that time from seeking appellate review because of his inability to pay for
the stenographic transcript required by statute. In 1956, after the decision in
Griffin, he sought release upon a writ of habeas corpus; the writ was denied
by the state courts of Washington. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding in a per curiam opinion that Eskridge had been denied the constitu-
tional right declared in Griffin. Despite the fact that two justices dissented,
"believing that on this record the Griffin case, decided in 1956, should not be
applied to this conviction occurring in 1935, '' 170 the majority did not explain
their logic of retroactivity. When the question of retroactivity is the central
question in a case, a court should accompany its decision with reasons. As
Professor Freund has said of Eskridge:
The answer involves considerations, not only of principle but also of
practical administration, that seem to call at least for some further de-
lineation; but the problem was disposed of summarily on the authority of
the earlier decision [in Griffin].171
Assertion without reasons is unnecessary when reasons are available, as they
are here, and unwise in any circumstance; it leads too easily to the suspicion
that the law of the case is based upon power alone, and not upon reasoned
analysis and judgment..7 2
These cases 173 are instructive, then, in helping to answer the question of
when, in the case-by-case process of announcing and initially applying a new
decision was to deny retroactive effect to the new rule, the question would remain of the
status of persons already released from jail by lower court writs of habeas corpus.
168. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
169. See also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), applying the rule in Griffin to a
conviction had in 1953; Comment, 55 MicH. L. REv. 413 (1957).
170. 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958).
171. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 185-86 (1961).
172. See Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1958) ; Hart,
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 84 (1959) ; Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H.nv. L. REv. 1, 22 (1959).
173. A further example of the failure of the Supreme Court to address itself to rele-
vant questions of retroactivity is provided by Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961). Emil
Reck was convicted of murder in 1936 and sentenced to a term of 199 years. After earlier
proceedings were unsuccessful, People v. Reck, 392 Ill. 311, 64 N.E.2d 526 (1945) ; Reck
v. People, 7 Ill. 2d 261, 130 N.E.2d 200 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 942 (1956), Reck
sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that a confession used against him at trial had
been obtained illegally. The district court noted that "Reck was convicted of this crime in
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rule, a court should reach the issue of retroactivity. In Durham, the question
was presented prematurely and need not have been reached. In Griffin, the
question similarly was presented prematurely and was appropriately avoided.
In Eskridge, the question was appropriately before the court in a case and
controversy requiring its resolution; it was therefore properly reached, but
should have been decided more forthrightly than by the sub silentio technique
employed.
GuIDES AND CRITERIA FOR RETROACTIVITY
Once a court has properly before it the specific issue of retroactivity, and
once it has recognized the desirability of accompanying its decision with ex-
plicit reasons, it should rely upon reasons that functionally relate to the newly-
announced rule and that reflect an awareness of the operative effects of its
decision. An unusual example of the confusion which may result when a court
fails to identify and apply meaningful criteria to a decision determining retro-
activity vel non can be seen in the "extraordinary"1 74 case of Warring v. Col-
poys.175 The case involved the interpretation of a federal contempt statute
which punished misbehavior in the presence of a court "or so near thereto as
to obstruct the administration of justice." In 1918 the Supreme Court had
held in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States 7 6 that the statute was to
be given a causal, rather than a geographic, interpretation; it was applicable,
therefore, to acts done at great distances from the court so long as they had a
"reasonable tendency" to obstruct justice. This interpretation prevailed until
April 1941, when the Supreme Court in Nye v. United States 177 overruled
1936 and at that time the Due Process Clause was not violated by the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of his confession. Today, the Due Process Clause is violated." United
States ex rel. Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1959). The court found,
however, that although the confessions by subsequent standards were coerced, this con-
sideration was overbalanced by its belief that Reck was guilty, that evidentiary problems
would preclude retrial twenty-two years after the crime, and that if released Reck was likely
to commit further crimes. It held that under these circumstances due process did not require
retroactive application of the coerced confession doctrines. Id. at 747. In addition, it cited
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Griffin to support its conclusion that "the Due Process
Clause must... speak prospectively in Habeas Corpus cases." Ibid. The Court of Appeals
affirmed upon the wholly different ground that the confessions were voluntary. United
States ex reL. Reck v. Ragen, 274 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1960).
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion which details the evidence
relating to the giving of the confession and concludes that, by the standard set in the sub-
sequent cases, the confession was coerced. 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (two justices dissenting).
No mention was made of the question of retroactivity in the majority opinion. The decision
would seem to apply retroactively to Reck's confession constitutional standards that had
not been enunciated when he gave it. Cf. DONNELLY, J. GOuSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, CRTUMNAL
LAW 289-97 (1962).
174. HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAMING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 631 (Tent. ed. 1958).
175. 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Vinson, J.); cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941).
176. 247 U.S. 402, 421 (1918).
177. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
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Toledo Newspaper and held that the words "so near thereto" must be given
a solely geographical construction. In so holding, the Court set aside convic-
tions under the statute which were based upon acts done in Aprif 1939 at a
distance of more than 100 miles from the federal courthouse. The petitioner
Warring had been charged with contempt under the same federal statute for
acts done at a great physical distance from the court. He was convicted on
February 24, 1939-two years before Nye overruled the Toledo Newspaper
doctrine and two months before the actions central to Nye even took place.
After the decision in Nye, Warring sought release upon a writ of habeas
corpus.
The question presented was whether upon habeas corpus Nye should be
given retroactive application to events which occurred two years before it was
announced. The district court for the District of Columbia denied the writ
and Warring appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Speaking through Judge Vinson, the court considered the petition as pre-
senting primarily the question of whether the new construction put on the
contempt statute by the Nye decision in 1941 "took away the District Court's
power to adjudge one guilty of contempt... .-178 in 1939 "when in that year
the Court had the power under [a different] construction."' 179 What is impor-
tant, the court found, was the "plane"'180 on which the change in the construc-
tion of the law stood. The Constitution stands on a higher plane than a stat-
ute, and a statute stands on a higher plane than a judicial decision. But judi-
cial decisions interpreting an unchanged statute stand upon the same plane.
To make Nye retroactive and thus deny the jurisdiction of the district court
in 1939, the court said, would be "to place the Nye case on a higher plane
than, for example, the Toledo decision"' 1 and the cases which adhered to it.
But Toledo and the subsequent cases "were on the same plane as the Nye
case,"'1 2 since they all involved interpretation of the same unchanged statute.
Inexorably, this was held to mean that retroactivity must be denied. The
moving premise behind this inexorability seems to be that an overruling an-
nouncement can be retroactive only if it is on a higher plane than the decision
which it is overruling; if it is merely on the same plane, it cannot lay claim
to being the "basic, superior law"'81 3 which is a prerequisite of retroactive ap-
plication.' 8 4
178. 122 F.2d at 645.
179. Ibid.
180. Id. at 645-47.
181. Id. at 646.
182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.
184. The tenor of the court's discussion is perhaps best demonstrated by its summary
of the considerations which should "guide the lawmakers and the law-appliers in making
their determinations in respect of whether a change in the law is to be effective only for
the future or also for the past." The court says:
All of the loose ends presented in this discussion on the effect of altering the law
can be pretty well tied together when it is realized that law is not a pure science,
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The same result would follow, under these broad rules, even if Warring
had been convicted before Nye, having appropriately but unsuccessfully chal-
lenged Toledo Newspaper, and sought reversal in an appeal taken after Nye;
the conviction would presumably have to be affirmed because the district court
at the time of the conviction had the power to find Warring guilty.185 The
performance of the court in Warring is not typical, and need not become so,
but it demonstrates the ease with which a decision on retroactivity can go
grievously astray. It becomes necessary, then, to suggest factors which a court
should consider in determining the issue of retroactivity.
The Purpose of the Newly Announced Rule
In deciding whether to give a new rule retroactive effect, a court to which
the issue properly has been presented first should attempt to identify the pur-
poses of the new rule, next should determine whether on balance those pur-
poses will be served by general retroactive application of the new rule, and
finally should decide whether these purposes will be promoted by retroactive
application of the new rule in the particular case before it.
Many courts, for example, will be urged to apply retroactively the rule of
Mapp v. Ohio that illegally seized evidence may not constitutionally be ad-
mitted in a state criminal proceeding. A reading of Mr. Justice Clark's ma-
jority opinion would probably suggest to a lower court that the central pur-
pose of the Mapp rule is to deter police conduct which violates "the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment" and to insure that "the [consti-
tutional] right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers"
no longer remains "an empty promise." 186 The rule was not devised to require
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence because of its inherent unreliability;
or put another way, the Mapp case manifests no constitutional doubt that
those convicted on the basis of illegally seized evidence had committed the acts
with which they were charged. Therefore a court deciding the issue of retro-
activity of the Mapp rule should ask: Would the release from prison of every
person whose conviction was based upon illegally seized evidence have any
effect in deterring unconstitutional searches? Assuming a finding of some de-
terrent effect, would it be substantial enough to outweigh the undesirability
of reversing the convictions of many assumedly guilty prisoners? Since the
that law loses its vital meaning if it is not correlated to the organic society in which
it lives, that law is a present and prospective force, that law needs some stability of
administration, that the law is all the law there is, that law is more for the parties
than for the courts, that people will rely upon and adjust their behavior in accordance
with all the law be it legislative or judicial or both.
Id. at 646.
185. See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 635 (Tent. ed. 1958). For comment on Warring v. Colpoys, see
Note, 28 VA. L. REv. 656 (1942) ; Note, 26 MINN. L. Rnv. 658 (1942) ; Note, 27 IowA
L. Ray. 315 (1942) ; Note, 16 U. CINc. L. Rnv. 71 (1942).
186. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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function of the rule is to deter future illegal searches by making such efforts
fruitless, a court could reasonably find that application of the rule to persons
convicted on the basis of past illegal searches would at best have slight deter-
rent effect upon future misconduct, and that whatever deterrent effect would
result from retroactive application would be insufficient to warrant across-the-
board release of prisoners. 8 7
Cases posing the question of whether the Mapp rule should be made retro-
active may yield the same answer-a denial of retroactivity-both to the ques-
tion of across-the-board retroactive application and to the question of differ-
entiated retroactive application on a case-by-case basis. But the two questions
may require different answers when the retroactivity of a rule with a function
other than deterrence is under consideration. For example, although the rule
against the admission into evidence of coerced confessions 188 is usually said
to be based upon a desire to deter improper police practices and brutality,18 9
it also draws strength from the belief that a coerced confession will often be
untruthful. °9 0 Thus, although one purpose of the coerced confession rule-to
deter future coercion-might not be furthered either by general or selective
retroactive application, another purpose of the rule-to assure that no person
is punished on the basis of such inherently unreliable evidence-might well be
served by either general or selective retroactive application. Because the em-
pirical assumptions underlying this second aspect of the rule may be said to
raise doubts about whether the man in prison is really the man who committed
the crime, a court could reasonably find that the rule demands reexamination
of at least those convictions based in substantial part upon coerced confes-
sions.
Problems of retroactive application are not limited to the announcement of
new criminal rules, however; they are also presented by the announcement of
new civil rules. In the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., for
example, the court announced for the first time that an automobile manu-
facturer's duty to inspect for negligence-which previously extended solely
187. It might be argued, however, that the release of all prior-incarcerated prisoners
would have some "shock" value in demonstrating to the police that the courts intend to
stand behind the new exclusionary rule.
188. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227 (1940); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
189. See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). Cf. Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954).
190. Professor Wigmore regarded the possibility that a confession might be untrust-
worthy as the only valid reason for its exclusion. 3 WIGMolE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed.
1940). See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298 (1960).
Students of human behavior have cast considerable doubt upon the reliability of "volun-
tary" confessions as well. See, e.g., FREUD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE ASCERTAINMENT OF
TRUTH IN COURTS OF LAW 23, COLLECTED WORKS, Vol. II (1956) ; REin, THE COMPULSION
TO CONFESS 259-62, 265-66 (1959); ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE
AND THE PUBLIC 94-95, 139-49 (1956).
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to the dealer-would now extend all the way to the ultimate third-party pur-
chaser. This rule may be said to embody several purposes. One purpose of the
rule may have been to increase the likelihood of a plaintiff's recovery by al-
lowing suit against the manufacturer as well as against the dealer. A second
purpose of the rule may have been to place the loss resulting from the plain-
tiff's accident upon the person who is in the best position to distribute the cost
of the accident broadly throughout the community. Still a third purpose of
the rule may have been to place an affirmative and enforceable duty to inspect
upon the automobile manufacturer-who is presumably in a better position to
inspect than either the dealer or the purchaser-in order to decrease the fre-
quency of accidents resulting from faulty parts.
The first purpose-increasing the likelihood of a plaintiff's recovery-would
certainly be served by retroactive application, for such application would assure
that more plaintiffs could sue the defendant with the deeper pocket. The sec-
ond purpose-spreading the incidence of loss-would probably also be served
by retroactivity, for the costs of negligent losses often can be distributed as
well by charging higher prices in the future to absorb past unexpected ex-
penses as by prospectively pricing a product so as to absorb future anticipated
expenses. The third purpose-discouraging noninspection by the manufacturer
-might not be furthered by retroactive application, however, because, as with
Mapp, the new rule cannot have the desired deterrent effect upon manufac-
turers' conduct already completed.
A court faced with a rule with a variety of purposes, some of which will be
served by retroactive application and some of which will not, may find it diffi-
cult, therefore, to decide whether on balance the dominant function of the rule
will be furthered by such application. 191 All that can reasonably be asked is
that a court diligently search out and identify every reasonable purpose under-
lying the rule and wisely employ its judicial expertise in arriving at a balanced
and articulated decision.
The Element of Surprise
Even if a court determines that the purposes underlying a new rule will on
balance be served by retroactive application, it must still decide whether fur-
191. This determination of the function of a new rule will continue to be an extremely
difficult one. For instance, following the adoption of the twenty-first amendment, which
repealed the eighteenth amendment, federal courts were asked to release upon habeas corpus
prisoners serving sentences for violating the National Prohibition Act. If the purpose of
the repeal was to concede that the nation had made an erroneous designation of what should
be illegal, there is some justification for ordering retroactive application to persons con-
victed as a result of that admitted error. However, if the purpose was to change the
methods of dealing with a problem which itself had changed in quality, scope, and serious-
ness, there is justification for limiting the repeal to prospective application only. In fact,
petitions for habeas corpus were uniformly denied. See, e.g., Ellerbee v. Aderhold, 5 F.
Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ga. 1934), and text at notes 45-48 supra.
Quaere: can the purpose of a rule based upon equal protection, as, e.g., the rule of
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), ever be served by retroactive application?
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ther considerations would counsel against retroactive application. One such
consideration is the degree and quality of the surprise which would result from
the change in the rule of law. This consideration--often phrased in terms of
fairness to the litigants-asks the question: Will a decision to make the new
rule retroactive defeat reasonable expectations and justified reliances that were
based on the assumption of the continued existence of the old rule? Several
aspects to this problem must be dealt with.192
First, the element of surprise will not realistically be an operative factor in
a great many cases because the parties will have acted without any knowledge
at all of what the governing law was; whatever law is finally held to govern
their conduct, whether it be the old rule or the new rule, will be a new rule
to them. 19 3 This is something of what Cardozo meant when he wrote, "The
192. Because this Comment is concerned primarily with the actions of federal courts,
for whom prospective overruling should be regarded as prohibited by Article III of the
Constitution, it will not deal with the question of the effect which prospective overruling
has upon a litigant's incentive to urge the adoption of a new rule when he knows that the
benefit of the new rule, if he is successful, will be denied to him. The problem, of course,
remains an important one for state courts. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.,
18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (". . . to refuse to apply the new rule here would
deprive appellant of any benefit from his effort and expense in challenging the old rule
which we now declare erroneous. Thus there would be no incentive to appeal the uphold-
ing of precedent since appellate could not in any event benefit from a reversal invalidating
it." Id. at 28, 163 N.E.2d at 97). Cf. Terracciona v. Magee, 53 N.J. Super. 557, 148 A.2d
6S (1959).
The situation with respect to unfairness may be different, however, when so-called in-
stitutional litigants are involved. The interest of an institutional litigant such as an insur-
ance company in having a rule of law changed is not limited to the specific case in which
it seeks the change; rather, it extends to a whole class of cases which will arise in the
future and in which it can make use of the change in law. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S.W.2d 588 (1943), overruling National Life & Acc. Ins. Co.
v. O'Brien's Executrix, 155 Ky. 498, 159 S.W. 1134 (1913). Similarly when a state supreme
court prospectively overrules at the instance of the State a prior interpretation of a criminal
statute, the State has been deprived of only a single conviction; it will be able to have the
benefit of the new decision in all subsequent cases. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623,
107 P.2d 324 (1940), overruling City of Roswell v. Jones, 41 N.M. 258, 67 P.2d 286 (1937),
and text at notes 71-76 supra. An organization like the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People which engages in frequent litigation in order to establish
principles to be applied to a large number of similar cases in the future may also be con-
sidered to be an institutional litigant.
Because the use of prospective overruling will not deprive an institutional litigant of the
substantial benefit of the new rule which it won, its use is not likely to dry up incentive
to challenge established law or to discourage attempts to seek changes in the law. But in
cases involving only private litigants, state courts should consider whether, the example
of prospective overruling will discourage others from bringing new and creative ideas and
arguments to appellate courts for fear that they will be arguing the cause not for them-
selves but for another. See von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37
HARV. L. REv. 409, 426-27 (1924) ; HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL. PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 623-25 (Tent. ed. 1958).
193. The respect due reliance under such circumstances was a particular concern of
Jerome Frank. See his opinions in Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 153 F.2d 172, 174 (2d
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picture of the bewildered litigant lured into a course of action by the false
light of a decision, only to meet ruin when the light is extinguished and the
decision is overruled, is for the most part a figment of excited brains."'194 And
it is something of what Gray meant when he said, "Practically, in its applica-
tion to actual affairs, for most of the laity, the law, except for a few crude
notions of the equity involved in some of its general principles, is all ex post
facto."' 195 Thus, in many cases, the parties, because of their not uncommon
ignorance of the legal principle that controls their actions, will not be able to
make a bona fide claim of surprise. In these cases a sense of unfairness to the
parties from retroactivity would have to stem from other considerations.
Second, the quality of the surprise which is created by a judicial decision
will in part be a reflection of how consistent and settled was the law from
which the new decision is departing. Sometimes the prior rule will have been
embodied in a single landmark opinion which the jurisdiction has consistently
adhered to and reaffirmed. To overrule such a precedent when the parties had
based their conduct upon it would result in surprise. More often, however,
the precedents are not in such monolithic condition. There may be two or
three overlapping and partially inconsistent lines of cases in an area, each at-
tempting to distinguish and limit to their facts the other lines. An authorita-
tive, codifying decision primarily clarifies an uncertain area of the law-even
if it specifically overrules cases in one or all of the inconsistent lines-more
than it states a new rule reversing abruptly a single old rule."' In such cir-
cumstances, the existence of inconsistent and conflicting precedent may not
provide the basis for reasonable reliance on any single precedent; a party here
can do no more than act upon the best available guesses of how a court, if
litigation ensues, will approach the conflict in the relevent precedent. Because
the conditions for reasonable reliance are not present, the possibility of a bona
fide claim of surprise is unlikely.
Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion); Helvering v. Proctor, 140 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1944)
(dissenting opinion) ; Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 292, 295-98 (2d
Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion) ; In re Marine Harbor Properties, Inc., 125 F.2d 296, 299
(2d Cir. 1942) (dissenting opinion). See also GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW
100 (2d ed. 1921).
194. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 122 (1921). Elsewhere Cardozo
said:
My impression is that the instances of honest reliance and genuine disappointment
are rarer than they are commonly supposed to be by those who exalt the virtues of
stability and certainty.
Address Before the N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 263, 295
(Jan. 22, 1932).
195. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 100 (2d ed. 1921).
196. Retroactive clarification of uncertain law ordinarily involves no unfairness. It is
retroactive change of settled law, not retroactive settling of unsettled law, which may
produce unjust results. This is why interpretative rules issued after the enactment
of a new statute may normally speak as of the time of the statutory enactment.
Retroactively applying an original interpretation of an unclear statute is not unfair.
1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.09, at 350 (1958).
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Third, it will not do for a litigant to claim surprise in cases in which the
overruled decision has long been eroded by cases which have all but explicitly
overruled it. Decades of cases limiting the original decision to its facts, distin-
guishing it from almost indistinguishable situations, declining to overrule it
in apologetic tones that seem to admit that consistency would compel such an
overruling-decades of cases so treating the older decision would seem to
make it a weak reed upon which to rely. Parties might nevertheless claim that
although they recognized that the precedent was eroded, still it was not over-
ruled, and they had no way of knowing when the temper of the court would
finally be hospitable to administering the coup de grace of explicit overruling.
But this is the same kind of claim suggested when the parties were faced with
selecting between several partially inconsistent lines of precedent. It rests not
so much upon unfairness resulting from surprise as it does upon unfairness
resulting from the necessity of choice in an area in which there is less cer-
tainty than one, compelled to act, would wish.
Fourth, even when the meaning of the relevant precedent in an area is fair-
ly clear and has not been questioned or challenged by later cases, reliance
upon it need not always be regarded as giving rise to a claim of surprise when
the day of overruling arrives. If the precedent was made in a lower court and
has never been passed upon by the highest court of a jurisdiction, reliance
upon it is generally held to be similar to reliance upon an uninterpreted statute
-the party relying does so at his peril.19 7 "In his case," as Cardozo put it,
"the chance of miscalculation is felt to be a fair risk of the game of life, not
different in degree from the risk of any other misconception of right or
duty."' 9 s The rule may find justification in the degree of freedom which it
maintains in an appellate court when it first is asked to pass upon the ques-
tion; the court is not bound by any lower court decision, no matter how old
be that decision. So, too, courts may not honor reliance upon a decision-
even if made by the highest court of the jurisdiction-which was rendered
many years prior to dramatic changes in the field of activity to which it is
relevant.1 9 If the area of activity has undergone spectacular growth or con-
traction, parties should not be surprised if a court makes a decision recogniz-
ing these changes, rather than relying upon a case decided before any of the
changes occurred. Any good lawyer, asked about the reasonableness of reliance
upon the aging precedent, would have counselled that reversal was at least a
good possibility.200
197. Compare State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934),
with United States v. Calamaro, 137 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1956) and State v. Striggles,
202 Iowa 1318, 210 N.W. 137 (1926). See In re Luster, 12 Ill. 2d 25, 145 N.E.2d 75
(1957).
198. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148 (1921). See Evans v.
Supreme Council, 223 N.Y. 497, 503, 120 N.E. 93, 97 (1918).
199. Compare Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) and
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), with United States v. Inter-
national Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) and United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222
(1955).
200. See generally Traynor, Unjustifiable Reliance, 42 MniN. L. REv. 11 (1957).
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It has also been suggested that the conceptual division of the law into pri-
mary and remedial rights and duties may provide a further basis for identify-
ing unfair surprise to the parties.20 1 Under this analysis, primary law is de-
fined as the principles which announce basic policies and duties to which an
individual must conform; remedial law is defined as the principles which pro-
vide sanctions and methods of enforcement for failure to conform to the duties
prescribed by the primary law. Although admitting the difficulty of adequately
distinguishing between primary and remedial law for many purposes, advo-
cates of this approach nonetheless find it useful in great measure. Its general
thrust is that decisions which result in changes in the primary law are likely
to create or destroy pre-existing duties, while decisions which result in changes
in the remedial law are likely to change merely a method of enforcement,
leaving the pre-existing duty in force. From this is drawn the conclusion that
greater surprise is likely to result from a change in the existence or non-
existence of a duty than from a change in the method of enforcing a duty
which already exists.
The MacPherson 202 case illustrates at once the utility and the limitations
of the primary-remedial distinction as a method of identifying actual surprise.
The case is usually read to announce that an automobile manufacturer has a
duty to inspect for negligence which extends all the way to the ultimate pur-
chaser of the product. Read in this way, the case imposes a duty upon the
manufacturer which was not present before it was decided; he is held liable
to a person when it had never been held previously that he had any duty to that
person. This would appear to be a change in the primary law. Such a change
would be said to raise legitimate claims against retroactivity. But the case is
susceptible of another reading. Even before the decision in MacPherson an
automobile manufacturer had a duty to dealers to inspect his cars for negli-
gence, and dealers could enforce this duty against the manufacturer. What the
court did in MacPherson was to extend that duty to third-party purchasers
as well. Read in this way, the case did not create any new duty upon the
manufacturer; it merely widened the range of persons to whom that duty was
owed. This would appear to be a change in the remedial law, and such a
change would be said to raise as significant a claim against retroactive appli-
cation as would a change in the primary law.
A more satisfactory approach to the problem of ascertaining the degree of
actual surprise created by a change in legal doctrine might acknowledge the
usefulness of the primary-remedial distinction as a starting point but would
proceed to inquire further into the real impact of the change upon those to
whom the new rule would be applied retroactively. Thus, even if MacPherson
201. See generally HART & SAcxs, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (Tent. ed. 1958). See FHA v. The Darlington, Inc.,
in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter says:
While, to be sure, differentiation between "remedy" and "right" takes us into
treacherous territory, the difference is not meaningless.
358 U.S. 84, 93 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
202. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E, 1050 (1916).
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is read merely as effecting a remedial change, by widening the range of per-
sons to whom the pre-existing duty was owed, the court should inquire into
the real content of the pre-existing duty. For example: Was the "duty" ever
enforced against the manufacturer in suits brought by dealers? Was the manu-
facturer aware of and insured against suits brought for violation of the duty?
Only by asking questions of this kind can a judge go beyond the formalistic
distinction between primary and remedial law as a method of ascertaining
actual surprise.
The distinction between primary and remedial duties and rights is not
wholly unrelated conceptually to the more familiar distinction between sub-
stantive and procedural duties and rights.20 3 This distinction has had some
viability in the related problem of when to give newly-enacted statutes retro-
active application. The general rule has been framed along lines similar to
those framed by the primary-remedial doctrine: if the statute is substantive,
it must have prospective application only, but if it is procedural, it may have
retroactive application as well. The substantive-procedural distinction raises
the familiar difficulties of classification, and can work results which give rules
of procedure an importance for decision which most often might be thought
to be associated with substantive rules only. Statutes relating to personal dis-
ability to sue, for example, may be said to do no more than regulate the pro-
cedure for enforcing substantive rights, but when applied retroactively they
may prevent a litigant from ever enforcing the right.2 4 Again, newly-enacted
statutes requiring the deposit of security in stockholders' derivative suits may
do no more than regulate the procedure for enforcing substantive rights, but
when applied to a suit in progress may result-though only procedural-in
its termination.2 0 i A court, wishing to employ the procedural-substantive dis-
tinction as an aid to ascertaining actual surprise must realize, therefore, the
limitations of the construct and must be prepared further to inquire into its
relevance for the purposes at hand.
It might be argued that the availability of a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine the rights and status of individuals should be a factor in a court's con-
sideration of whether surprise counsels that it give its decision prospective
effect only. This argument would contend that since the parties could have
sought a declaratory judgment and thus avoided the surprise that often ac-
companies a retroactive decision, it is not unfair to subject them to that sur-
prise when they have failed to take advantage of this anticipatory procedure.
This argument seems unrealistic when applied to cases in which the law
seemed to be clear to the profession and the overruling decision was almost
totally unexpected; if the holding of the overruled decision was clear and had
not been eroded by subsequent decisions, a party would seem justified in rely-
ing upon it without first seeking the superfluous assurance of a declaratory
203. See Note, 71 YALE L.J. 344, 349 (1961).
204. See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). Cf. Coster v.
Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943) ; Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W.
120 (1939).
205. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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judgment. To impose upon the parties the burden of the surprise resulting
from a completely unexpected overruling decision, solely upon the ground that
they had it within their power to avoid that surprise by seeking a declaratory
judgment of the obvious, would not seem reasonable. Moreover, the argument
that the availability of a declaratory judgment justifies denying relief from
overruling decisions which create surprise is unrealistic for most tort cases,
since the parties will not have previously considered that the acts they con-
template doing are arguably tortious, and impractical for many contract cases,
since the parties under commercial pressures will not be able to abide the time
required for a court to hear the case and grant a declaratory judgment. How-
ever, the argument may have some validity as to institutional litigants 206
which can reasonably expect to be involved in periodic lawsuits on given
questions, such as hospitals uncertain as to the statfis of the charitable im-
munity doctrine in their jurisdiction or insurance companies uncertain as to
the validity of a proposed addition to its standard policy. It may also have
validity as to questions of the interpretation, construction, and constitution-
ality of statutes which have never been passed upon judicially.
The Administration of the Courts
In determining whether to give a retroactive reach to an overruling de-
cision, a court may be urged to consider the effect such retroactivity will have
upon the administration of the courts. It is often argued that retroactive effect
should be denied to a new rule of criminal due process if a result of retro-
activity will be to burden the courts with petitions for habeas corpus from
incarcerated prisoners, perhaps "in numbers unknown to us. '" 2 0 7 According
to this argument, retroactivity should be granted if at all only when there is
some indication-such as statistical data of the number of imprisoned persons
who could potentially take advantage of the new rule-that the volume of
cases likely to result is within the ability of courts to handle with reasonable
administrative efficiency and expenditure of time. In many cases such an in-
dication may be impossible to procure; for example, no one knows the num-
ber of persons presently serving state prison sentences as the result of convic-
tions had prior to Mapp v. Ohio 208 and based upon illegally-seized evidence.
But whether the indication is reliably statistical or is only a sage guess, this
view reflects the value judgment that granting the benefits of the new rule to
those convicted under the rejected rule may not be worth the necessary ad-
ministrative burden of processing the resultant load of habeas corpus petitions.
Court dockets may be crowded and groaning in many parts of the nation,20 9
but if other considerations counsel a court to make a new due process rule
retroactive, it is difficult to see why prisoners have less of a right to be on
206. See note 192 supra.
207. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
208. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge,
71 YALE L.J. 218, 236 n.105 (1961).
209. See generally ZEISEL, KALVEN, & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).
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these dockets than the divorce and tort claimants who largely account for the
present delay in the courts. The sense of injustice which compels retroactive
application of the new rule in favor of convicted prisoners ought not be de-
feated merely by a fear of overworking the judiciary or temporarily postpon-
ing hearings on civil cases.
The considerations of retroactivity which are based upon the administration
of the courts have a second aspect. This aspect embraces the argument that
many judicial decisions, if given retroactive force, could be applied fairly only
upon an uneven basis, thus diminishing respect for the judicial system. Ap-
plied to the Mapp case, for example, this argument would find unfairness in
the fact that those prisoners who could win release, assuming Mapp were
given retroactive application, would be those fortunate enough to be able to
prove that illegally-seized evidence was used against them at trial, and that
such proof may today, years after trial, depend upon such fortuitous factors
as whether a transcript was kept at the trial, whether the police officers who
made the seizure are dead or otherwise unavailable for questioning, whether
there were witnesses to the illegal seizure, whether these witnesses are avail-
able for questioning today and can remember what took place then, whether
the prisoner can afford a lawyer to help him assemble what evidence remains
available today on the illegality of the search. To make release dependent upon
such factors, according to the logic of this argument, would be to draw arbi-
trary distinctions between persons similarly situated. But the same fortuitous
circumstances that would come to bear upon habeas corpus proceedings also
come to bear daily at trial; many persons otherwise similarly situated often
receive different treatment from the law because of the fortuitous circum-
stance of their superior or inferior access to evidence, to competent counsel,
to money, and to witnesses. While such unfairness need not be regarded as
desirable, it ought to be recognized as sometimes inevitable and as inhering
in every stage of the judicial process. Such disrespect for courts as results
from unfairness caused by fortuitous factors is already with us in large meas-
ure; it would seem difficult to say that it will be increased significantly by the
allowance of certain habeas corpus hearings in which further fortuitous un-
fairness may occur.
CONCLUSION
The use of prospective overruling by a federal court should be deemed pro-
hibited by the case and controversy requirement of Article III of the Consti-
tution. When a federal court overrules a prior decision and announces a new
rule of law by applying it to the litigants in the case or controversy before it,
it should withhold any statement as to the retroactive effect of the new rule.
The question of whether the new rule should be applied retroactively should
not be decided until it is presented to a court as an actual case and contro-
versy. The decision as to retroactivity should then be made, but only after a
consideration of criteria relevant to the purpose of the new rule and to the
equitable and effective operation of the legal system.
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